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Abstract: 
 
Given the current political environment in the US, there is great doubt about the future of 
American policy on climate change. Still, the optimistic future of American climate 
policy relies on the new group of leaders that have emerged from municipal government. 
Although local government is traditionally ignored in favor of the publicity of 
international negotiations between countries, cities have established a role at the forefront 
of climate policy over the past ten years. These local governments serve half of the 
world’s population and often are extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, 
making their contributions more important than ever. Although they face a unique set of 
difficulties, cities are able to take a range of actions impossible at higher levels of 
government, reaching communities in unprecedented ways and innovating new policies. 
This project aims to analyze how local governments fit into the global political regime on 
climate change, testing the theoretical framework of multilevel governance against real-
life examples in Boston and New York City. Further, this paper finds that cities 
compensate for their relatively small size and limited jurisdiction through a unique set of 
actions and collaborative relationships, enabling these local actors to become 
international leaders on this complex global issue.  
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Section 1: Introduction 	  
1.A Background 
 Writing in the early months of 2017, the future of American climate policy sits in 
an unstable position. Despite former President Barack Obama’s leadership and executive 
actions on this issue, President Donald Trump and his administration have thus far 
continued to spread doubts about the validity of climate change science and have 
threatened to abandon US commitments from the United Nations Conference of the 
Parties (COP) Climate Talks in Paris 2015. However, even as the national government 
sits on this precipice of disastrous policy, subnational actors from state and city 
governments have stepped up to lead the American contributions to the global response 
on climate change.1  
Conventional understanding of climate change policy focuses on international 
agreements and national commitments. While there has been mild attention for state 
efforts over the past few years, city climate action receives even less acknowledgment 
from journalists and researchers despite its success and potential. 2  The common 
misconception is to view cities as flattened simply to their local people and properties, 
separated from global issues.3 Many people view cities simply as weaker versions of their 
national governments, unable to act independently or take leadership on an issue. 
However, in recent years, the amount of academic literature discussing city climate 
policy has dramatically increased, and this research almost unanimously claims that local 
governments are important and valuable actors on climate change. 
Furthermore, with Trump’s election, focus has shifted to subnational actors in a 
way it never has before. After the presidential campaign, mayors and governors from 
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across the country proclaimed their resistance to Trump’s climate policies, and almost 
every week brought a new article or letter about these political leaders refusing to wait on 
national government to act.4 Americans are looking for new actors on climate change, 
and lately subnational governments have stood in the spotlight. For instance, on a recent 
visit to Boston College, the former President of Ireland and climate activist Mary 
Robinson described this political change at the national level and stated: “I don’t want 
people to feel that the US is no longer leading on these issues.”5 She further claimed that 
it is important for the rest of the world to feel the “extraordinary progress” of 
“determined leadership” below the national level. These remarks demonstrate the global 
significance of city and state actions and allow for a sense of hope even as our national 
environmental agencies lose their claims to legitimacy. 
In many ways, cities are not only the newest but also some of the most important 
actors necessary to combat climate change. Urban centers hold over half of the world’s 
population, and as hubs of economic action, these areas contribute a large amount to 
greenhouse gas emissions.6 This understanding expands on the widely accepted concept 
of a “global city,” or an urban area with an impact on the global economy. Furthermore, 
these municipalities often are more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Two-
thirds of the world’s largest cities are situated on coasts, exposed to sea level rise.7 These 
local actors have taken action on climate change at phenomenal rates and have 
established a clear role for themselves in the global response to this issue. Cities around 
the world have established international networks, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, 
developed new plans for resiliency and even taken positions at the UN. In one 
particularly substantial action, eighty of the world’s largest cities became members of the 
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C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, a climate network that now represents over 600 
million people and over one quarter of the global economy.8 
Given this success, academic research is rapidly increasing its focus on this local 
contribution to climate change efforts. Michele Betsill and Harriet Bulkeley have led this 
movement and produced a large amount of research.9  Their foundational work is 
accompanied by scholars like Rachel Krause, Saskia Sassen and Taedong Lee, who each 
tend to focus on more specific aspects of city climate action.10 To review some of the 
main literature on climate responses to climate change, Benjamin Barber’s work finds 
that mayors are essential to any urban action, a finding supported by this study.11 
Furthermore, Barry Rabe focuses on state climate policy, but his perspective on the 
importance of subnational action provides a valuable foundation for work on the local 
level of government. He claims that the US does in fact have a “‘climate policy…’ albeit 
one that consists of a number of rather fragmented pieces rather than a single, 
comprehensive initiative.”12 This conclusion fits well with the broader implications of 
this paper. Perhaps most importantly for this paper, scholars like Kristine Kern, Arthur 
Mol, J. Corfee-Morlot and his colleagues discuss the parameters of the theoretical 
framework known as multilevel governance.13  
The findings of these scholars and the framework of multilevel governance form 
the basis for my own research, but in general academic work on this topic leaves several 
gaps that will be answered by my work below. Most importantly, this paper will use both 
theories and real-world examples to demonstrate key concepts. This approach is fairly 
unique compared to the tendency of scholars to either focus on abstract theory or case 
studies. This perspective will be described in more detail in Section 1.B, but its 
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distinctive nature is owed to the collection of interviews with city officials in Boston and 
New York City. In particular, very little research has analyzed how abstract concepts like 
political legitimacy or vulnerability to natural disasters have practical impacts on city 
climate action. Similarly, current analyses on the themes and trends in city climate 
strategies are extremely limited, but this paper will continue to link theories to practical 
examples in order to place these strategies in context. In addition, this study will address 
a smaller gap in previous academic literature by illustrating examples of state 
governments supporting and encouraging climate action at the local level. This finding 
came almost entirely on information gained in interviews with real city officials, and it is 
generally a very rarely acknowledge aspect of the relationship between these levels of 
government. Through this simultaneously theoretical and practical approach, this paper 
aims to provide a new perspective on the ways in which cities are taking action on 
climate change.  
1.B Approach and Main Themes 
 This study uses both primary and secondary sources on city climate action. While 
the examples of secondary research in academic literature are essential to my findings, 
interviews with Boston and New York City officials served as the primary sources and 
foundation of this paper. Over the summer of 2016, I interviewed officials from several 
different departments and agencies, allowing me to gather a range of perspectives on the 
many facets of city climate policy. Appendix 1 shows the full list of city officials, their 
positions and departments. From Boston, I spoke with officials from the Metropolitan 
Area Planning Council, Greenovate, Boston Recycling and Zero Waste, and the 
Environment Department. From New York City, I interviewed officials from the NYC 
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Department of Environmental Protection, C40 and the Mayor’s Office of Sustainability. 
While I customized each interview based on the individual’s experiences and position, a 
sample set of interview questions are listed in Appendix 2. All interviews with recorded 
with the consent of the interviewees (with the exception of my conversation with Axum 
Teferra, during which the recording device was not functioning properly), and each was 
sent a copy of this study to approve before its final submission. These two cities are at a 
far end of the spectrum demonstrating extremely successful climate policy with a 
supportive state government, and so while their example is not universal to all American 
cities, their success helps to demonstrate the nuances of different theories.  
Examples in Boston and New York City serve two purposes in this research: first 
to provide practical examples of abstract concepts and second to demonstrate the 
potential success of city action. An urban approach will inherently be defined by local 
characteristics such as community values, history of environmental action, state support 
or vulnerability to natural disasters, and thus it is impossible to generalize based on any 
individual city’s example.14 Still, characteristics of a municipality’s climate policy that 
are supported by literature or by multiple primary sources have more applicability to a 
larger scale. Furthermore, the limitations of certain conclusions are fully acknowledged. 
The report also uses examples from American cities in more resistant states. Overall the 
conclusions drawn from Boston and New York City highlight the characteristics of 
effective policy and show potential pathways to a successful response to climate change.  
 Beyond this primary research in these two Northeastern cities, the theoretical 
framework of multilevel governance also is essential to this project. While this political 
structure will be examined in much greater detail in Section 3.C, this theory summarizes 
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the complex set of actors and relationships that influence policy, making a system of 
governance rather than government and thus indicating what Hambleton defines as 
“government plus the looser processes of influencing and negotiating with a range of 
public and private sector agencies.”15 Beyond governance, Kern and Mol break this 
multilevel framework down into three dimensions.16 First, the hierarchical dimension 
refers to the ways that superordinate levels of government are able to influence the city. 
Second, the horizontal dimension describes the ways that local actors create relationships 
with their counterparts in other urban areas both regionally and internationally. Third, the 
vertical dimension examines the ways that cities are able to “flip” the direction of 
influence in order to lead higher levels of government. Ultimately, these dimensions 
demonstrate that local governments play a distinctive and important role in issues that go 
far beyond their borders. This perspective allows readers to see how cities take part in the 
“big picture” of the global climate regime. 
1.C Hypotheses and Outline 
 Given this framework, this study sets out with several key hypotheses. First, 
following the general focus of popular literature and media on this topic, mayors as well 
as vulnerability to the impacts of climate change will motivate local response. Second, 
the urban response to climate change will mostly use small-scale strategies that provide 
benefits at a local level rather than seeking to contribute to global climate change 
strategies. Third, the federal nature of American government will lead to states having a 
high level of control over their cities. This means that the division of power between the 
city and state will prevent the city from having the jurisdiction over the areas of 
regulation needed to reduce emissions or adapt to climate change. This hypothesis is 
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based on the widespread understanding and scholarship on decentralized government. 
Fourth, this study will disprove the common understanding that local governments are 
only concerned with their own people and geographic boundaries. Even a basic overview 
of academic literature on the horizontal dimension multilevel governance demonstrates 
that urban leaders coordinate their actions both with other municipalities and with higher 
levels of government. Fifth, a final hypothesis predicts that the local response to climate 
change will face different advantages and barriers not experienced by other levels of 
government, thus carving a unique role for cities in the multilevel governance response to 
climate change. This follows the general academic opinion about the importance of urban 
climate policy and seeks to disprove the common misconception that cities do not take 
part in this global policy issue.  
 The layout of this paper will attempt to examine the questions of these hypotheses 
as follows. Section 2 will provide an overview to some of the general characteristics of 
climate policy unique to local governments, basing findings mostly in primary research 
and practical examples. In contrast, Section 3 will focus mainly on theory and academic 
research, explaining the political structure of decentralized government and multilevel 
governance in American climate policy. Beginning the analysis of the specific 
dimensions of multilevel governance, Section 4 describes hierarchical power relations 
between the city and superordinate levels of government. Section 5 examines the 
horizontal dimension of city action through international and regional networks and 
relationships. Section 6 follows with an analysis of the vertical influence of urban 
governments, which acknowledges some of the larger impacts of city climate action. In 
all, this study aims to shed light on the ways that local governments contribute to the 
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global effort to combat climate change through an overview of their unique features and 
their place in multilevel governance. 
1.D Parameters and Key Terms 
 Before beginning to discuss these important issues, there are a few key parameters 
that define the rest of this paper. First, findings will be limited to American cities unless 
otherwise noted. Second, while the history of environmental policy is relevant, 
conclusions will only apply to policy areas within the issue of climate change unless 
otherwise noted. Third, this study will examine both adaptation and mitigation policies. 
Unless a finding refers to one of these goals specifically, conclusions can be assumed to 
apply to both. While an ideal study would be able to separate the influences and impacts 
of each of these policy areas, real-world policy often answers both goals. Furthermore, 
mitigation and adaptation can also share many characteristics, such as economic benefits 
or a local focus, and thus many conclusions within this paper can freely apply to both 
major kinds of climate policy. Generally, adaptation efforts are neglected in academic 
studies on city climate action, and so this blend of strategies allows the conclusions of 
this paper to fulfill a gap in earlier research. 
 Furthermore, there are several key terms used throughout this paper that merit 
clarification. First, the term “state” refers to the American level of subnational 
government rather than a nation-state. Second, the term “federal” will indicate the 
American system of decentralized government. The term “national” will be used instead 
when referring to the highest level of American government with the exception of quotes 
from academics, who often use the term “federal” to refer to the highest level of 
government. Similarly, the term “decentralized” will be used both to refer to the federal 
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structure of US politics as well as to a more general understanding of dispersed power. 
Next, “global climate regime” references the entirety of political response to climate 
change, including the actions from every country and every level of government. Last, 
the terms “city,” “municipality,” “local government,” and “urban response” will be used 
interchangeably. Unless otherwise stated, “city” and “municipality” refer to the local 
government within rather than to the geographic location of an urban center and its 
people in their entirety. These definitions help to clarify the discussion of Sections 2-7.  
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Section 2: Overview of City Climate Politics 	  
2.A Background 
 Before diving into the complexities of multilevel governance at the city 
government level, it is useful to develop a summary understanding of how local 
governments have engaged with climate politics thus far. By focusing on practical 
examples of city action, the following section provides an overview of how these 
municipal governments have approached climate change differently than their 
counterparts at higher levels of government. This background will assist in the later more 
theoretical analysis of how city climate action fits into the larger system of multilevel 
governance and decentralization (Sections 3-6). 
2.B Unique Origins of Political Action 
 City climate action is first distinguished from other levels of government through 
two of its origins. While local governments choose to act on climate for a variety of 
reasons, including economic health and public opinion, the most unique stimulating 
factors are due to the immediate threat of natural disasters and the importance of mayoral 
leadership at the city level. Stakeholder involvement also provides an important driving 
force for local climate policy, as will be examined in Section 2.D. These independent and 
internal factors drive cities to have different policy strategies than other levels of 
government. 
Difference from State and National Government 
In contrast to these important origins for city action, national response is 
obstructed due to a different set of factors. Most importantly, the influence of lobbying 
from large corporations and their “seductive bank accounts”17 has long helped to create 
Florack 
18 
the partisan divide and climate denial at the national government that plagues any attempt 
to create climate policy. In contrast, republican mayors from cities in Florida and New 
Jersey have collaborated with Democratic leaders on adaptation measures,18 and likewise, 
Republican communities led a climate action initiative in San Diego County due to the 
area’s vulnerability.19 Although some cities, such as Bloomington, Indiana,20 have leaders 
that are unsure about or deny the human impact on climate change, this uncertainty does 
not occur with the same partisan divide and outright rejection of science as it does at the 
national level. Carl Spector, the Commissioner of the Environment Department in 
Boston, demonstrates the decreased impact of scientific uncertainty in municipal 
government when he claimed that there is less uncertainty in models on sea level rise 
compared to what most people would assume.21 Without this barrier, local governments 
are more open to taking action on climate, especially if there is a persistent threat of 
natural disaster or strong mayoral leadership. 
Natural Disasters and Vulnerability 
 Sitting on unstable coastlines with significantly altered landscapes, cities are some 
of the most vulnerable sites of human habitation. Stone finds that the impacts of climate 
change are even amplified in the city, as demonstrated by the increased intensity of heat 
waves within an urban heat island.22 The city of Boston particularly exemplifies this 
vulnerability to natural disasters due to the city’s history of building on landfill close to 
sea level, and many areas downtown already flood routinely. Furthermore, a vulnerability 
assessment of the region surrounding Boston examines danger such as sea level rise, 
increased hurricane intensity, increased precipitation and changes in water quality.23  
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Although this increasing vulnerability occurs gradually along with climate 
change, actions to adapt to this new vulnerability are “often reactionary, coming after a 
dramatic change event.”24 The immediate impact and community disturbance that follows 
makes cities more likely to take drastic action following a natural disaster. As Elizabeth 
Hanson, the C40 City Advisor for NYC, stated, “We are… on the ground facing the 
impacts that we’re already seeing of climate change.”25 Several officials from Boston and 
New York City agree that Hurricane Sandy prompted new climate policy, and the sudden 
increase in climate-focused programs after the hurricane show practical evidence of this. 
As one Boston resident stated, “Superstorm Sandy really was the wakeup call for the 
northeast about climate change.” There is a large amount of academic support for the way 
that increasing vulnerability to natural disasters can motivate city climate action, 
including Van de Meene, Lee26 and Krause,27  as well as studies by C4028 and the Metro-
Boston Preparedness Task Force.29 Giest and Howlett claim that “because they are 
directly affected by the consequences of environmental transformations, cities are 
motivated to shape adaptation and mitigation” of climate change, thus explaining why 
natural disasters drive climate action much more forcibly at the local level rather than at 
the state or nation.30 Likewise, Barber explains this increased influence in two key ways. 
First, “city officials will be the first to be held accountable by angry residents.”31 Second, 
“come hell or high water… (local governments) have to worry about plowing the streets 
and providing parking.”32 This immediate accountability to daily citizen life ensures that 
municipalities are inherently concerned with threats to basic city operations. 
Unfortunately, local governments are often confined to this reactionary response in policy 
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rather than holistic and preventative measures due to a lack of jurisdiction, creating a 
barrier to city climate action that will be further analyzed in Section 4.A. 
Political Leadership 
 While political leadership plays an important role in all levels and forms of 
government, mayors appear to be especially significant in creating city policy. 
Unfortunately there is a significant gap in the literature to compare the roles and powers o 
mayors, governors and presidents, making it difficult to draw a legitimate comparison 
between these executive powers. However, the large amount of academic literature 
focusing on mayors as well as the repeated claims from city officials about the mayor’s 
importance suggests that this political leader may play a larger role at the local level of 
government. Similarly, logical assumptions based on the city’s decreased buraurcracy 
and consequential higher level of centralized control suggest the same. Still, it is 
impossible to fully compare political leaders from these different levels of government 
until this gap in academic research is fulfilled.  
Mayors and local political leaders are extremely well studied in academic 
literature, but many scholars argue about the weight of their contributions. Krause finds 
that policy entrepreneurs are the second most important factor for determining city 
climate action,33 and likewise Taedong Lee places political leadership as the second most 
important factor after his own emphasis on transnational networks.34 Agreeing with 
authors like Wilson and Starr, Pressman claims that mayors are able to use personal 
leadership skills to overcome potential barriers.35  
At the same time, a few academics argue that mayors may play a smaller or more 
symbolic role. Hambleton claims that the role of the mayor is outdated in globalization, 
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arguing for more dispersed leadership structure.36 Shi and her colleagues believe that 
these leaders can be resistant to climate policy,37 and even Pressman finds that other 
actors may play equally important roles to the mayor but may simply be less visible.38 A 
tangible example in Bloomington, Indiana mentioned earlier demonstrates that often 
environmental policy can be established without the support of the mayor.39  
Still, the literature overwhelmingly finds strong support for the role of the mayor, 
and my interviews with officials from Boston and New York City repeatedly support this 
opinion, making me inclined to agree. In Boston, Mayor Menino helped to some of the 
first sustainability programs, including bike rentals and a green buildings task force, and 
personally initiated the city’s first climate action plan.40 Similarly, Mayor Walsh has 
remained a strong supporter of climate policy.41 Carl Spector of Boston described the 
strong mayor-focused form of government and stated that “none of this (climate action) 
happens unless the mayor is a strong supporter of it.”42 Similarly, Mayor Bloomberg is an 
international leader in pushing for climate policy, initially for emissions mitigation with 
PlaNYC and then turning to adaptation after Hurricane Sandy with the Special Initiative 
for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR).43 Alan Cohn, a Climate Program Director for 
Integrated Water Management in NYC, noted that many city resiliency efforts were 
prompted by Bloomberg initiatives.” 44  Bloomberg even received international 
recognition for his leadership through his appointment to important roles like the chair of 
C40, a transnational network of cities on climate change, and the United Nations Special 
Envoy for Cities and Climate Change, making him, what one scholar described as, the 
“Mayor of the World.”45   
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However, while mayors have played an important role in both Boston and New 
York City, such a level of dependence on one leader can create barriers for climate 
action. As Mia Goldwasser, a Climate Preparedness Program Manager in Boston noted, 
the real challenge is sometimes simply getting an issue on the radar of the mayor’s office, 
making it difficult for climate policies that often are expensive and only produce benefits 
in the long-term to compete with “pressing, more urgent issues.”46 Similarly, the election 
of a mayor who is resistant to progressive action on climate would have disastrous 
impacts for related policy. In this way, the centralized power of the mayor can work 
either in favor or in opposition to successful climate policy depending on his or her own 
leadership. State and national governments have a more decentralized structure, making 
them unable to shift as quickly with a progressive leader’s initiatives but also preventing 
a drastic decrease in programs during the tenure of a more conservative leader. Overall, 
mayors have still provided a more positive force to encourage climate action, making 
them key players in urban responses to climate change. 
2.C Involvement of Community Actors in City Policies – Introduction 
Background 
 City climate politics are further distinguished and heavily influenced by the 
participation of local stakeholders and community actors. This active citizenry includes 
voters, businesses, nonprofit organizations, universities and many other groups. While 
interest groups play an important role at higher levels of government through lobbying 
and campaign donations, local actors are able to participate in urban government in a 
different way. Municipalities respond to the demands of these groups by establishing new 
policies and shaping them to retain community interests and participation. Groups like 
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the Green Ribbon Commission (a union of businesses), the Barr Foundation, and a 
progressive and active set of voters have all contributed to the successful policy response 
to climate change in Boston. 47  Similarly, Elizabeth Hanson, a NYC official, 
acknowledged the importance of the actors when she said, “We’re very fortunate to have 
very dedicated stakeholders here in New York City. So to some extent I think we’re 
among the best equipped in the world to try and try and figure out these solutions and 
policies.”48 
Stakeholder Motivations 
 These examples demonstrate the active interest of community actors in climate 
action, but a common misconception is that many of these actors would resist further 
regulations and “red tape.” There are a variety of overlapping reasons that any particular 
interest group would choose to engage with city climate policy, which can be broken into 
three larger categories of legitimacy, resources and culture. First, community groups that 
are established to address climate change are able to legitimize their message through 
partnership with city governments. For example, the Emerson Engagement Lab and the 
World Wildlife Fund reached out to Boston to help test a game to engage the public 
because of the city’s ability to reach these local actors, demonstrating how some groups 
may wish to spread their message through a city’s position.49 Second, stakeholders can 
gain resources from municipal governments in a variety of ways, especially if the city has 
a more progressive climate response. Public transportation businesses such as FlyCycle 
seek out government contracts. 50 Similarly, partnership with city governments allows 
environmental nonprofits to gain access to city funds. For instance, the Boston Living 
with Water Competition was a collaborative effort between Boston Harbor Now and the 
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city’s own departments, enabling this nonprofit to access a grant limited to city 
governments from Coastal Zone Management. Furthermore, businesses or institutions 
can simply be motivated by the economic threat that increased natural disasters place on 
their infrastructure investments. These stakeholders have long-term investments in the 
community, a factor that makes them distinct from the short-term election cycles that 
motivate many politicians. In addition,  
Third, these community actors may be more indirectly influenced by the culture 
of the city and its people, particularly if it is as progressive and liberal as Boston and New 
York City tend to be. This response to larger community values can be completely 
unintentional, in which a local organization or community group may reflect the attitudes 
of its residents and may feel the need to “do their part” for responding to climate change, 
particularly if they feel that government action is lacking.51 Similarly, organizations that 
are rooted in such a value-based culture, such as Boston Harbor Now, may have it firmly 
in their missions and processes to include sustainability in their work. Last, community 
groups may be influenced to take a more progressive persona on climate action in order 
to benefit from increased attention and a reputation of leadership, a goal that Bulkeley 
notes can be as desirable for businesses as it can for politicians.52 
Disagreement in Literature 
 Academics debate the importance of local stakeholders, but overall I find that 
these groups are essential for successful climate policy. Academics like Verschuuren and 
Kazin claim that the participation of local actors is essential for environmental policy, 
affirming the conclusions of the National Research Council.53 Likewise, Betsill and 
Bulkeley find that there is a “growing influence of a range of non-state actors in shaping 
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urban climate governance.”54 In contrast, Susskind argues that these groups have “narrow 
self-interested reasons” based on “short-term agendas”55 and believes that they are simply 
too  difficult to access, a conclusion that Anguelovski and a C40 report affirm.56  
Despite this debate, I find that these stakeholders are important to climate policy 
due to the strong demonstration of their support in Boston and New York City as well as 
the increasing motivations for these groups to take action. The community actors in 
Boston and New York City primarily help to promote climate action, but it is certainly 
true that some interest groups in certain cities would likely push back against increased 
regulation. However, the number of motivations for local actors to support climate policy 
described above suggests that the kinds of actors who work at this local level will be 
more likely to support rather than resist these protective measures. Furthermore, a closer 
look at the community actors in Boston and New York City shows that these actors are 
invaluable in shaping the urban response to climate change. For instance, they can 
stimulate climate policy (Section 2.D), and then policy comes to address their needs in 
return through framing (Section 2.E) and the type of strategies used (Section 2.F). As 
Bulkeley concludes: “Private actors are increasingly seeing cities as places within which 
to act on climate change… Public and private authority is being reconfigured and 
contested through urban responses to climate change.”57 
2.D Stakeholders Stimulating Climate Action 
 Often these stakeholders view it as their job to stay ahead of the city government 
and encourage it to take political action on climate change, a stance supported by 
Anguelovski as well as Corfee-Morlot and his colleagues.58 These groups help to 
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stimulate action in two key ways: direct action and indirect influence through the need to 
obtain political legitimacy.  
Direct Action 
 Stakeholders can prompt climate policy through direct action, whether that be 
through political pressure, information gathering, financial support or team participation 
and expertise. First, direct pressure for a specific program from community organizations 
may persuade a municipality to take action. For instance, one member of an 
environmentally-focused nonprofit in Boston stated that the role of these kinds of 
organizations was to “keep the issues on the table” and continually persuade government 
of their importance. Second, the Metro-Boston Regional Task Force on Climate Change 
noted that a report from Boston Harbor Now on rising sea levels was beneficial for the 
Metro-Boston Regional Task Force on Climate Change, thus demonstrating the 
encouragement from sharing information.59 Third, groups like the Barr Foundation and 
the Kresge Foundation have donated millions of dollars to climate adaptation efforts in 
the last few years.60 Last, cities often rely on the participation and expertise of these 
stakeholders to complete policies. Scholars like Fisher, Corfee-Morlot, Bedsworth and 
Hanak describe the important role of these groups in collaborative projects with city 
government. 61 Likewise, Mia Goldwasser, Carl Spector and Elizabeth Hanson described 
the importance of the expertise of these private groups in their working groups for 
projects like Climate Ready Boston, Climate Action Plan, and a project to limit emissions 
from buildings in both Boston and New York City.62 In another example, the MetroLab 
Network links a city to a local university in order to leverage academic expertise, 
partnering NYC to New York University.63 As one member of the environmentally-
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focused nonprofit in Boston mentioned earlier said, “We’re not background to the city… 
I would call us allies.” 
Indirect: Political Legitimacy 
In addition to their direct prompting of city action, community actors can hold 
sway and power over local residents and indicate their interests. Thus, obtaining the 
support of these groups is a matter of maintaining political legitimacy, a characteristic 
that governments always pursue in order to avoid instability.64 This is a more indirect 
force, and thus it can only be seen in the connection between community interests 
(particularly indicated by a reputation for liberal culture) and past policy, a point that 
scholars frequently comment on. For instance, Betsill, Kazin, Zahran and others observe 
that it is the communities with a liberal political constituency or prior interest in 
environmental issues that are most likely to respond to climate change.65 Other authors 
like Wilson and Starr emphasize the particular need for mayors to maintain political 
support.66 Frickel and Davidson take a more theoretical approach and finds that countries 
can only lead in sustainability issues if they are able to rationalize state environmental 
roles, which depends “critically on the types of linkages between nation-states and actors 
within civil society.”67 
While authors use the abstract theory of political legitimacy as helping to explain 
the actions of city government, only a few provide concrete examples. Starr’s work on 
the history of New York City and Krause’s finding that the city of Denver’s “climate 
involvement was linked to (the mayor’s) larger vision of establishing Denver as an 
environmental leader” are notable exceptions to this.68 This gap can be further addressed 
by empirical examples in Boston. For example, Susan Cascino, the city’s Director of 
Florack 
28 
Recycling, described the history of the local recycling program, noting that the 
community volunteers for the early initiative influenced the mayor to keep it on the city 
budget when she said, “There was constituent demand… and the city responded to 
that.”69 The vast range of programs that target community participation and  (described in 
Sections 2.E and 2.F) also help to show the importance of serving local interests through 
climate policy. Furthermore, the opinion of one member of an environmentally-focused 
nonprofit in Boston helps to explain the purpose of this overlap between community 
interests and programs. They claimed: “If you’re going to go ahead of the curve, you 
absolutely need political cover,” noting that an organization’s support demonstrates “the 
people’s will.” In addition to this regular practice through the culture of sustainability and 
progress in both Boston and NYC, these cities show that the demand for political 
response to maintain legitimacy is especially important following a natural disaster 
(described above in Section 2.B). Their responses after Sandy help to show that city 
governments will be held accountable for the losses sustained during a natural disaster, 
likely regardless of the culture of the community. This finding is further supported by the 
public outcry following the government response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. 
Despite this general finding of the correlation between a culture that has 
prioritized progressive or environmental action and climate policy, Krause’s finding that 
“city staff of 70% of US cities with an explicit climate protection effort described 
responding to interest group or citizen demands as only a ‘somewhat’ or ‘not important’ 
motivation for their climate initiatives.”70 Still, the repeated demonstration of the dual 
presence of both a culture of environmentalism and progressive climate policy suggests 
that this correlation is more important than city officials may recognize, likely due to its 
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indirect and hidden nature. While higher levels of government are also influenced by 
liberal cultures,71 a community opinion from such a large population will likely lack the 
unity of the smaller city community. Thus political legitimacy will likely play a larger 
role in stimulating climate policy at the urban level than at superordinate levels of 
government, and its impacts can be seen tangibly through the framing of climate policy 
and the types of strategies used (discussed in Sections 2.E and 2.F below).  
2.E Impact of Stakeholder Involvement – Framing  
What is Framing 
 A vast range of scholarship examines the framing of city climate policy, and 
while climate change is approached in many different ways at all levels of government, 
there are two key frames related to the city’s close relationship with its stakeholders. 
First, city climate action tends to have a local focus. Second, the benefits of action 
expand on this localization and are presented more as economic co-benefits or financial 
savings rather than for a contribution to global climate efforts. Framing is even more 
important for the actions of local governments because municipalities use persuasive 
power rather the top-down authority of higher levels of government.72 As mentioned 
previously, Frickel and Davidson emphasize the importance of rationalizing government 
roles in environmental policy.73 Often times, these frames can overlap, so that a policy to 
reduce emissions can be demonstrating both global leadership on climate change as well 
as a decrease in monthly electricity bills. This frequently inherent relationship between 
the two seemingly conflicting frames makes it nearly impossible to analyze these frames 
in isolation, but the following paragraph will attempt the useful task of drawing out the 
elements of each frame. Still, city actions tend to have a local focus that emphasizes 
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economic co-benefits of climate action rather than addressing climate change as a global 
issue. 
Local or International Focus 
 The origins of city action in natural disasters and the need to find political 
legitimacy (described above in Sections 2.B and 2.D) lead to a local frame. This means 
that city action is generally framed as a local effort with local benefits rather than a 
contribution to the international reduction in carbon emissions.  
International-focused actions still occur primarily in global networks of local 
governments and in the search for a global reputation. First, international city-to-city 
networks inherently will encourage actions that are based on a global strategy. For 
instance, Taedong Lee examines the ways international networks influence mitigation 
actions, and Beal and Pinson find that mayors are partially prompted to action through 
the growing globalization of cities.74 Boston’s Living with Water competition, which 
invited international participation, provides a more concrete example of this type of 
framing. More tangibly, the large amount of academic research on international city-to-
city networks demonstrates that many cities, albeit generally the largest ones, can take 
action on a global level (See Section 5). Second, mayors and city leaders interested in 
political leadership and reputation are particularly interested in international action in 
order to establish themselves and their cities as global leaders. Anguelovski finds that 
cities are motivated by the desire to “demonstrate leadership, and build the image of the 
city in national, regional or international arenas.”75 Again, New York City serves as an 
example of a global city through its commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, an 
action that primarily benefits the international effort to reduce emissions. Just so, 
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Elizabeth Hanson, the city’s C40 City Advisor, noted that Mayor de Blasio’s pledge to 
reduce 80% of emissions from a 2005 baseline by 2050 is based on the target outline by 
the UN.76 This commitment was also required by the Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance 
(CNCA) of which New York City is a member, but it helps to show how a global city can 
choose to take actions on climate change akin to those from different countries. This 
example helps to show how involvement in an international network provides the 
opportunity for local government officials to establish themselves and their city as global 
leaders on climate change.  
While international action is extremely important, especially in networks and 
political leadership, these strategies are only one part of a larger climate regime, much of 
which focused on local action. This trend of a local focus logically allows climate policy 
to addresses local needs rather than pursuing a more abstract public good. This focus is 
supported by authors such as Betsill, who believes that “ultimately, motivating local 
action to mitigate global climate change calls for an indirect strategy, focused on the 
ways in which emissions-producing activities are embedded in broader community 
concerns.”77 In another work with Bulkeley, Betsill claims that the need to address 
environmental issues from a local perspective has been a common trend in green political 
thought since at least 1987. 78  This supports Jasanoff and Martello’s finding that 
“environmental politics… has historically been a politics of the local,” a tendency that 
has been rekindled in light of climate change.79 Betsill and Bulkeley further develop a 
theory that following a period of municipal voluntarism, the second phase of an urban 
response to climate change is to “re-frame” climate change as an issue with significant 
local implications, and Sassen similarly argues for the benefits of this local approach.80 
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Similarly, Barber says that a global commons will be “sustainable only if cities and 
citizens make it their common cause.”81  
This large amount of academic support for the importance of local framing is 
further affirmed by practical examples. For instance, the Department of Environmental 
Protection’s Bureau of Environmental Planning and Analysis (BEPA) is looking to use 
integrated water management in order to address local needs and to improve 
communities. 82  In addition, Jessica Feldish, a Program Manager in the Boston 
Greenovate program, described her community engagement work as the “sidewalk talk of 
climate change” with the opinion that it is “really important to emphasize the things that 
are specific to Bostonians.”83 The Greenovate program works to motivate and educate 
citizens in order to mobilize their daily behaviors and make an individual contribution to 
climate action.84 In addition, the resilience plan for the city of New Orleans focuses on 
“main streets” as the starting point of analysis, looking at centers of community and 
economic life as the essential aspects of climate policy.85 Likewise, the vast number of 
reports on the local impacts of climate change demonstrates an effort to make this 
abstract global issue into a local one.86 These examples show the strong use of a localized 
approach to climate politics. Even still, the international aspect of action is often 
inherently connected to local policies. For instance, Elizabeth Hanson’s joint position in 
reducing emissions from buildings for both C40 and New York City helps to demonstrate 
how the same action can be both international and local focused.87 
Co-Benefits or Climate Leadership 
 Betsill claims that climate change policy is “most likely to be reframed as a local 
issue” when the action can be linked to issues already on the local agenda, and just so, 
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city climate actions are further localized through the framing of advantages as co-benefits 
as opposed to climate leadership for its own sake.88 Krause develops a persuasive 
argument here, claiming that it is important to frame issues in order to affirm that the 
causes and consequences of the issue are within the city’s power to change. She argues 
that this often leads to a series of policies that are only implicitly related to climate 
change, finding that most city level actions are framed as being taken for energy or cost-
saving reasons.89 Likewise, scholars like Matisoff, Anguelovski, Rabe and others find 
that climate change policy tends to focus on the vast number of co-benefits.90 Betsill also 
finds that a focus on co-benefits allows city politicians to avoid the debate about the 
legitimacy of climate change science, providing an advantage to municipal action.91 
Bedsworth and Hanak support this conclusion, and similarly, Krause finds that co-
benefits allow for more bipartisan support of climate policy.92 Thus, Betsill finds that 
ironically, the “most effective way to get municipal networks to mitigate global climate 
change is by not talking about global change; the best strategy may be to ‘think locally, 
act locally.’”93 For example, sustainability efforts in the more conservative Bloomington, 
Indiana focus on money-saving benefits, a local issue, rather than framing their work on 
climate adaptation, a global issue.94 
 Notably, a C40 report found that in city staff in Portland, a place where citizens 
are generally supportive of climate action, had to be more flexible in their messaging due 
to competing budget priorities and to, as Bedsworth and Hanak describe it, “foster 
broader community buy-in.”95 The C40 report further emphasizes the importance of 
“presenting the case” for climate action in terms of financial benefits and improved 
health and equity beyond “simply reducing emissions or risks from climate change.”96 An 
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example in Boston practically demonstrates this strategy. The executive summary on 
Mayor Menino’s Green Building Task Force Report is entitled, “Everyone benefits from 
green building… everyone,” and the entire report goes through each possible co-benefit 
of green construction.97 Just within the front cover, a quote from Menino reads, “High 
performance green building is good for your wallet. It is good for the environment. And it 
is good for people,” showing a choice to blend the benefits of this climate action in order 
to gain more support.98 
While authors such as Betsill, Bedsworth, Hanak, Corfee-Morlot and his 
colleagues describe many kinds of co-benefits, including health, equity, energy security, 
vulnerability and ecological protection, the most common frame for climate policy is 
through economic savings.99  Betsill claims that: “cost-effectiveness is the ultimate 
criterion on which city councils make budget decisions. It is thus important for city 
officials requesting money for climate-related projects to demonstrate the economic 
benefits.” 100  This is supported by Krause’s finding that a large margin of city 
governments state that their primary motivation in climate policy is to reduce energy-
related expenses. 101  Alan Cohn, the Climate Program Director at the Bureau of 
Environmental Planning (BEPA) within the NYC Department of Environmental 
Protection (DEP), helped to demonstrate this financial focus when he said that his 
department’s role is to find “more cost effective solutions.”102 
While this trend towards a framing of co-benefits generally creates wider public 
support for climate policies, there are also some drawbacks to this strategy that may 
adversely impact city climate action. Frickel and Davidson predict a very negative 
consequence from this kind of framing, claiming that: “Environmental improvements 
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undertaken in an effort to maintain political legitimacy are not likely to permit or support 
deeper reforms necessary to sustainability,” resulting in incremental and often conflicting 
policies rather than truly addressing the root causes of environmental issues.103 Given this 
plausible outcome, any government that uses a co-benefits framing must be careful not to 
become over-dependent on these additional benefits and must make a habit of 
rationalizing environmental policies for their own sake. 
As noted previously, framings to emphasize co-benefits or to recognize climate 
leadership in its own right are often inherently interconnected. Overall, while climate 
policy is often framed to focus on saving costs, it is unlikely to ever be established solely 
for this benefit. This demonstrates how delicately framing is used in an effort to maintain 
political legitimacy. Furthermore, just as there is the need to maintain public support and 
legitimacy is somewhat satisfied by naming the co-benefits of climate action, a different 
kind of public demand requires cities to take actions that address climate change for its 
own sake. This climate leadership is often tied to a desire to establish an international 
reputation for a city. International frames become tied to climate-specific actions, often in 
the form of international intra-city networks, which will be further discussed in Section 5. 
2.F Impact of Stakeholder Involvement – Types of Policy  
 The unique origins, stakeholder involvement and framing of city policy also 
contribute to an emphasis on certain kinds of policy. Local response to climate change is 
most unique for its general trend towards adaptation and community participation. It is 
impossible to directly connect the selection of these types of policy to the characteristics 
described above, but one can still find hints of the influence of vulnerability, political 
leadership, the impact of stakeholder interest and the local and co-benefit framing. 
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General Focus on Adaptation 
 Overall, cities tend to focus more on adaptation than higher levels of 
government.104 Mitigation remains a significant part of city climate policy and often 
makes up the majority of climate related programs,105 but the proportion of adaptation 
policies seems to be higher than state and national action. Supporting this claim, Romero-
Lankao and her colleagues find that there is “increasing attention to adaptation among 
planners at all levels of government but particularly at the municipal level.”106 For 
instance, New York state passed a law on a resiliency policy in 2014, but NYC has an 
established Office of Recovery and Resiliency that works to consider adaptation needs in 
every government process.107 Although academic literature lacks a quantitative review of 
this balance between mitigation and adaptation policy in cities, a variety of factors 
suggest that local governments take a strong interest in resilience. 
First, academic literature claims that there is a connection between a focus on 
adaptation policy and increased vulnerability to climate change impacts, described above 
in Section 2.B. For instance, Graham and her colleagues found that Hurricane Sandy led 
Mayor Bloomberg to focus on resilience policy with his Special Initiative for Rebuilding 
and Resiliency (SIRR).108 Similarly, both Krause and Betsill found that high levels of 
vulnerability generally increase adaptation efforts.109 John Brock, a Project Manager 
under the Bureau of Environmental Planning and Analysis (BEPA) at the NYC 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), stated that the adage that “There is 
always a larger storm” has prompted preventative adaptation policy.110 Continuing this 
support, a C40 report found that the “growing frequency and magnitude of climate-
related shocks” led to a increasingly urgent adaptation response, causing adaptation-
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related actions to grow from 11% of all climate actions in 2011 to 16% in 2015.111 This 
finding suggests that the importance of resilience policy will only increase as the threat of 
natural disasters intensifies with climate change, a prediction that has already come to 
fruition in Boston’s extremely vulnerable construction. The city’s low-lying landfill base 
is already often flooded in large storms and likely has motivated the successful adaptation 
policies already in place, such as a recent group of innovative architectural proposals to 
make public spaces near the coastline into tiered landscapes.112 
A tendency to increase resiliency also reflects the local and co-benefit framing 
described in Section 2.E. For instance, Van de Meene and Lee’s claims that mitigation is 
considered long-term and large-scale while adaptation appears to provide short-term and 
immediate benefits.113 This finding would indicate that a policy framework based on 
local co-benefits of climate action would likely tend towards adaptation-based strategies. 
Krause supports this claim when she finds, “Adaptation, unlike mitigation, provides 
direct local benefits and thus should not be hindered by the barriers” of collective 
action.114 In addition, some adaptation policies can provide co-benefits for resilience 
against other social ills.115 Mayor Bloomberg’s PlaNYC program demonstrates how 
closely these benefits can be intertwined through its triple focus on equity, sustainability 
and resiliency.116 By supplying immediate local benefits, these policies respond to the 
need for political legitimacy. 
While I agree that adaptation policies almost always produces these local benefits, 
mitigation actions can do the same,117 again leading multiple themes of urban action to 
overlap. Furthermore, adaptation policies generally focus on local or regional changes, 
maintaining action within the limited jurisdiction of the city. For instance, Houston and 
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Toronto have projects to rebuild the storm water infrastructure in their cities to adapt to 
flooding hazards.118 The impacts of this limiting authority will be examined further in 
Section 4.A, but for now, it seems that while mitigation efforts can be limited by this 
small authority, adaptation actions can flourish in the same conditions. Still, some city 
leaders in Boston suggest that adaptation policy inherently increases the commitment to 
mitigation policy.119 As noted throughout this section, other framings can also overlap 
with these two kinds of policy. This can lead to several different combinations of framing 
still based on these unique elements, making city climate policy diverse and flexible. 
leading to locally-focused mitigation policy that attempts to provide co-benefits.  
Community as a Target for Action 
 City climate policy also aims to achieve high levels of community participation, 
indicating the impact of stakeholder involvement, political legitimacy and local framing. 
This participation is more initiated by the city government than the prompting forces 
described in Section 2.D, looking to the community as a resource to be tapped through 
voluntary participation rather than a stimulating force or top-down regulation. A fair 
number of academics and reports affirm this focus on community action within city 
policy. For instance, Anguelovski describes it as “community-based adaptation” 
approaches, and a UN Environment Programme (UNEP) argues that a primary way for 
cities to reduce climate impacts is by influencing their citizens’ behavior.120 For instance, 
educational policies can encourage people from the suburbs to use public transit rather 
than drive cars in order to reduce emissions or to build rain gardens to reduce flooding. 
Prager similarly claims that collaboration (here referring to high participation) is key to 
natural resource management and environmental policy, and Weinberg and his colleagues 
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go farther to claim that the lack of local participation in the recycling program in Chicago 
led to the ultimate degradation of environmental efforts.121 In addition, some scholars 
believe that the greater focus on natural disasters and adaptation policy can lead to 
increased community participation, a more indirect connection. Randolph claims that 
climate adaptation plans need to engage the public rather than continue top-down 
practices, suggesting that a community response is beneficial following a natural 
disaster.122 Similarly, Prager finds that a community-based approach is more effective 
with the “proximity” of environmental problems.123 
Furthermore, pursuit of political legitimacy and a local framing are closely related 
to this community focus. Involving local actors in policy will give them a stake in its 
success, thus increasing their support for a political agenda. Similarly, policy that aims to 
address local needs and concerns can most easily do that through simply involving the 
community within. Overall, the unique local focus of cities encourages them to engage 
with the public in their climate policies. 
  Over time, climate policies in New York City and Boston have increasingly 
aimed to target local actors. For example, Alan Cohn and John Brock, who both work in 
the Integrated Water Management Group within the NYC DEP, describe the 
department’s recent growth. A new director recently began to push the department to 
move beyond its traditional focus on maintaining large infrastructure in order to consider 
community participation and more decentralized policy.124 Their efforts have since grown 
from an early challenge to restaurants to decrease water use to a recent and very large 
public competition to reduce the number of plastic bags in New York’s Waterways.125 
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This hands-on community-based approach earned the department an EPA grant to further 
develop its growth in peer-to-peer learning and partnership.126 
 Community-targeted environmental policy has a longer history in Boston but has 
similarly increased in recent years. In 2006, Mayor Menino established the Greenovate 
Awards to recognize stakeholders who led on sustainability efforts in the city.127 Mayor 
Walsh has since developed this program to assist in the implementation of the City’s 
Climate Action Plan by working with the public and performing outreach. As Jessica 
Feldish, a Program Manager for Greenovate, stated: “The focus is really getting 
Bostonians to take climate action” on their own terms.128 This statement demonstrates the 
city’s understanding that community participation is an important resource in reducing 
emissions. While Feldish noted that the program’s dedicated focus to community 
involvement is “unique,” it is clear from the expansion of Greenovate that Boston has 
invested heavily in this engagement and finds its benefits useful in achieving their overall 
goals.129 She described Greenovate’s purpose as “really sourcing the work that our 
colleagues do and making it accessible to the broader community.”130 Similarly, Susan 
Cascino, the Director of Recycling in Boston, found that her department’s role is to 
disseminate information about larger policies, looking at how changes at the state level 
will affect the community and how best to increase local engagement.131 Cascino noted 
the difficulty of prompting behavior modification, but this continued commitment of staff 
and resources demonstrates Boston’s understanding of the importance and value of 
community participation.132 
 A few programs in Boston show that the city targets the community in order to 
use these stakeholders as a resource. While the importance of their direct assistance was 
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described above in Section 2.D, this collaboration is prompted more by the city and 
expands on the idea of expertise. For instance, the Climate Action Plan collected two 
years of community input, prompting the city to develop the Greenovate Program as well 
as Climate Ready Boston.133 In this way, the city allowed the community to access its 
policies and stimulate action, thus benefitting both public and private actors. Similarly, 
the Designing with Water Challenge sought out new ideas from the community through a 
competition to build a more resilient waterfront. Programs like these examples rely on 
voluntary participation and can benefit city policies by finding new ideas and further 
engaging the community.  
 Cities have a unique ability to access these community stakeholders, finding a 
new path for climate policy that may address some past policy gaps. It is a common 
sentiment, at least within the city officials of Boston, that this accessibility is a trait 
unique to local government. Carl Spector, the Commissioner of the Environment 
Department in Boston, described this detailed outreach as the “power of the cities,” 
noting that it is “hard for the state to do that.”134 Similarly, Mia Goldwasser, Boston’s 
Climate Preparedness Program Manager, claimed that the “state doesn’t engage 
communities… in the same way that the city can.”135 A few academic scholars comment 
on this accessibility, including Krause, who supports these Boston officials’ statements 
by claiming that local government is “closest to the citizen and may be able to influence 
local resource use in a more targeted way than other levels of government.”136 Similarly, 
Sassen writes on this larger role and finds, “Cities are critical for emerging intercity 
networks that involve a broad range of actors… that potentially could function as a 
political infrastructure with which to address some of these global governance 
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challenges.”137 This statement hints at a larger understanding of the city’s role in the 
global climate regime, which will be analyzed throughout the rest of this paper. 
2.G Concluding Thoughts: Importance of Accessibility 
 Thus far, local governments have engaged with climate politics in several key 
ways. Distinctly motivated by vulnerability, political leadership and the driving force of 
stakeholders, the urban response to climate change uses a framework focused on local co-
benefits of action, an increased focus on adaptation policy and community engagement. 
While cities take action for many other reasons and use many different strategies, the 
characteristics described above help to give an overview of how city climate politics may 
be unique from actions at higher levels of government.  
Most importantly, impacts on policy described in Sections 2.E and 2.F truly 
distinguish local response to climate change. In particular, local focus and accessibility to 
stakeholders are essential to building the community support for the broad-sweeping 
policies that climate change requires.138 By making this abstract global issue into a 
tangible aspect of daily life, local governments can build a stronger culture of 
environmental action, which in turn will continue to push the government to create more 
progressive policy. This back-and-forth between stakeholders and city government allows 
the community to encourage or amplify a policy response to climate change while 
simultaneously providing the municipality with the unique benefits of widespread 
participation. For instance, the city of Boston targeted the community by helping to 
establish the Green Ribbon Commission, a group of businesses working towards 
sustainability, and this group eventually has come to put pressure on the government to 
increase its climate efforts. In the other direction, community input led to the 
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establishment of Greenovate, which now offers greater opportunity for stakeholders to 
access government. City governments are able to communicate with local actors through 
this faster feedback loop, making more effective and increasingly progressive climate 
policy. As acknowledged previously, some municipalities that lack the vulnerability, 
political leadership or culture of environmental action will be less likely to have this 
back-and-forth progression of climate change policy. Regardless, this accessibility is one 
of the most important and distinctive features of city climate action, especially as the 
impacts of climate change increase and thus prompt more cities to action. With this 
background in mind, one can more closely analyze the ways that the city relates to other 
levels of government in order to find factors that distinguish the local response to climate 
change. 
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Section 3: An Introduction to Multilevel Governance  
3.A Background 
In order to fully investigate the factors that lead an American city to establish 
climate policy, one must also consider the impacts that higher levels of governments may 
have on their municipal counterparts, both from the national and state level. City officials 
and scholars agree that city climate action often stems from a lack of action at higher 
levels of government, generally noting that subnational efforts “fill a policy void” left by 
national inaction.139 For instance, Baltimore’s Office of Sustainability cited their state 
governor’s lack of advocacy as a strong motivation to become more of a leader in this 
policy area.140 However, the influence of state or national government goes beyond 
simply prompting the origins of city climate policy.  
The different levels of government are often perceived as being separate entities 
that work independently from each other, taking a literal interpretation of the phrase 
“division of power.” For instance, Barber argues that cities and states are “necessarily in 
tension,” showing the common misconception that cities function in isolation from their 
counterparts at the state and national level.141 Instead, the impact of a city’s relationship 
with higher levels of government constitute a much more complicated dynamic than a 
simple hierarchy or battle between progressive and inactive levels of government. 
Corfee-Morlet and his colleagues’ argument aligns with the broader academic concept of 
multilevel governance, an abstract perspective found to be a “critical factor shaping urban 
climate governance.”142  
As increasing numbers of municipal governments are engaging in various 
activities that can be described as multilevel governance, the form of national 
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government in the US plays a key role in shaping the urban response to climate change, , 
a principle confirmed by Jorgensen and others’ work on Belgian city climate policy.143 
Thus an overview of federalism and cities’ traditional roles in environmental protection 
provides helpful background before analyzing the more abstract theory of multilevel 
governance.  
3.B Decentralization and American Federalism 
American federalism is built both on hierarchical and decentralized forms of 
power, meaning that loose environmental regulations come from centralized government 
and are implemented in the various lower units of more localized government. While 
these two characteristics may seem to be in conflict, the following overview of past 
environmental policy helps to show each element in turn. However, in times of where 
there is a lack of support or efficient action by centralized government, as there is today 
on climate change, this hierarchical relationship loses some of its importance while 
decentralized action becomes increasingly significant. 
Common knowledge and academics disproportionately focus on policy at the 
national level, and while it is true that many environmental policies originate at this 
centralized government, environmental issues in the US are traditionally marked by 
heavy reliance on subnational actors for implementation.144 States and local governments 
began regulating early environmental issues long before national government became 
active in the 1970s.145 This decentralized responsibility only became more prevalent 
under President Reagan, who pushed for enhanced state government, and with it reduced 
national environmental regulation. Since then, national government has failed to take 
concrete and effective policy action on the issue of climate change, despite the efforts of 
Florack 
47 
President Obama’s executive orders. As recently elected President Trump and his 
administration have declared their contempt for national environmental regulation, it is 
fairly certain that this trend of increased decentralization and reliance on subnational 
levels of government will continue as cities continue to work for effective responses to 
climate change, thus expanding the importance of the decentralized element of American 
federalism. These structural features apply to almost all US cities, so while local factors 
like community interest and state support will have a large influence on the effectiveness 
of city action, American municipalities all tend to share at least the political background 
described below. 
Tradition of Decentralized Action in Environmental Policy 
Even today, national regulations on environmental issues are more far-reaching 
than their equivalents at lower levels of government, but “even those policies adopted by 
the federal government have been… heavily reliant on states for either initial policy 
development or central roles in implementation, leading to a remarkably decentralized 
governance approach for an issue generally framed as a ‘global’ problem.”146 While Rabe 
was referring to climate change issues in this quote, the same general dependence on 
lower levels of government applies to many other environmental regulations. For 
example, the Clean Air Act relies on states to issue air quality permits, and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requires state and local implementation.147 
Similarly, Susan Cascino, the Director of Recycling for Boston, noted that while 
innovations in recycling originate in the state government, they rely on municipalities to 
implement their regulations.148 In this way, it is clear that local government is often 
extensively involved in climate policies established at other levels of government and can 
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even be an essential factor in determining the success of these policies. This helps to 
demonstrate the increasing role of decentralized action in environmental and climate 
policy. 
Traditional City Independence 
The principle of decentralization continues from the state level to the local 
government, resulting in a fair amount of independence and power for cities. Part of this 
power must come from necessity: cities are on the frontlines facing the impacts of 
environmental degradation, and thus they are often the first that must respond without 
waiting for superordinate levels of government to act. This necessity clearly draws a 
parallel today, as cities are often the first to experience the most obvious impacts of 
climate change in the form of sea level rise and increased intensity of hurricanes. On a 
more historic note, this relative level of independence and authority is embedded in 
American government. Goldshore notes that local government have historically 
maintained significant control over land use, public health, and safety, including 
“substantial responsibilities in the delivery of environmental services.”149 Overall, the 
environmental issues faced by cities in the last centuries have well prepared them to act 
on climate change, acknowledging that some local governments “have considerable 
experience in addressing environmental impacts within the fields of energy management, 
transport and planning.”150  
 In recent years, cities have become even more independent and gained more 
control over local resources, further showing the increasing role of decentralized action. 
For instance, in the 1970s, New York City desperately looked to Washington DC for help 
following a fiscal crisis, but Barber argues that today DC looks to New York City, while 
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“New York often looks to other cities or abroad.”151 There are even instances of 
pushback, where cities worked to defend local authority even if state or national 
governments have regulatory powers over the same activity.  For instance, a municipality 
in the state of New York used a local zoning law to restrict hydraulic fracturing in its 
region, even going to court to defend their authority.152  
The decentralized system of the United States has created a relatively independent 
and authoritative role for city governments in environmental issues, but cities are still 
ultimately under the control of their states in many issues, as will be described below in 
Section B. Overall, the decentralized structure that permits this independence cannot be 
separated from a more structural division of power, and thus jurisdiction over certain 
policy areas often remains with state or national government.  
Cities as Environmental Leaders 
With this relative independence, cities are often held up as examples of 
environmental leadership, but they have not historically always been positive influences. 
For example, Goldshore claims that cities often refused to host landfills required for safe 
waste disposal, instead attempting to regulate their own solid waste.153 Still, it seems as if 
over time cities have become greater environmental leaders. Barber concludes,  
“In an earlier epoch, the federal government was more often than not the ‘good’ 
power enforcing local liberty and civil rights… But nowadays, when it comes to 
issues of global cooperation among cities, it has been the federal authorities that 
have often thwarted cosmopolitan outcomes in the name of nationalist 
parochialism, as in the crucial case of global warming.”154  
 
Kazin explains this increasingly liberal nature of cities, noting that “progressives 
routinely win elections,” possibly due to the “inevitable consequence of demographic and 
cultural change” or the organization and activism of these groups.155 Regardless of its 
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cause, many American cities have established themselves as environmental leaders in the 
last few decades, and often it is these cities that are the first to take action on climate 
change. Still, while almost all cities have established a strong claim to local authority, not 
all cities use this power to benefit the environment, and many simply remain inactive on 
climate change. Overall, the significance of urban governments and their decentralized 
has increased in recent years, especially as national government fails to supply 
hierarchical regulation on climate change. 
3.C Dimensions of Multilevel Governance 
Because there is no complete climate policy at the national level, subnational 
actors cannot engage in the same patterns of American federalism. The theoretical 
framework of multilevel governance helps to explain the new forms of power relations 
that have emerged with the current lack of hierarchical action on climate change and the 
subsequently increased importance of decentralized action. This lens allows an 
understanding of the new divergent pathways of American federalism, particularly 
changing or expanding on its original elements of decentralization and hierarchy. 
To first explain this theory in its own right, many scholars now rely on the 
concept of multilevel governance to explain city climate action, with some going so far as 
to claim that an understanding of global environmental and climate governance is only 
possible through this perspective.156 Jorgensen and her colleagues trace the development 
of literature on climate change policy, first beginning with a focus on international and 
national initiatives, then emphasizing sub-national action, and for the past decade 
focusing primarily on multilevel governance.157 The phrase “multilevel governance” 
refers to a perspective that examines not just the traditional “government” involved in a 
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policy issue, but also the range of actors who may influence it. Scholars examine the 
complicated interactions between levels of government, the development of transnational 
networks, and the participation of both public and private actors in policy decision-
making.158 In other words, “Multilevel governance also provides a flexible conceptual 
framework to understand the relationships between cities, regions and national 
governments across mitigation and adaptation policy issues.”159 Overall, this theoretical 
lens allows readers to see the ways in which different levels of government interact and 
produce climate policy, resulting in an understanding far more complicated than the 
simple division of power or traditional American federalism. This innovative 
understanding looks at how multiple structures and institutions shape global 
environmental policy, providing the most comprehensive framework from which to 
analyze the urban response to climate change.160  
As noted in Section 1.B, Kern and Mol define three dimensions of multilevel 
governance: hierarchical, vertical and horizontal.161 In a short summary, the hierarchical 
dimension refers to the ways that higher levels of government shape the actions of the 
levels below, the vertical dimension describes the ways that lower levels of government 
influence those above, and the horizontal dimension references the relationships between 
governments at the same level. While Corfee-Morlot and others have also used this 
distinction between the vertical and horizontal dimensions, Kern and Mol include a 
hierarchical dimension to separate the directions of influence between cities and states.162 
This means that the hierarchical aspect focuses on the way that cities implement the 
policies set by higher levels of government, and the vertical aspect focuses on the ways 
that cities in turn can influence the levels above.163 The third dimension of Kern and 
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Mol’s understanding of multilevel governance is horizontal, referring to the ways that 
cities create networks and relationships between each other both regionally and 
internationally. 164  Unlike Corfee-Morlot and his colleagues, Kern and Mol define 
horizontal dimension as solely between government actors rather than including non-state 
actors, and this paper follows suit.165  
While their analysis is meant to explain the relationships between the European 
Union and subnational governments, Kern and Mol’s addition of the hierarchical 
dimension can help to examine the remaining hierarchical element of American 
federalism. The second two elements of multilevel governance, horizontal and vertical, 
help to demonstrate the offshoots and new forms of decentralization. These three 
dimensions impact all cities in varying amounts, and they provide the necessary 
framework to examine the political process behind city climate policy. While it is still 
true that each city and state has a unique set of local influences and factors that will 
determine whether or not it takes action on climate change, some of the impacts of 
multilevel governance apply more generally. However, the overarching system of 
multilevel governance creates both barriers and catalysts for action at several levels, 
regardless of many of the individual characteristics of the cities.  
Although multilevel governance is primarily helpful for describing the recent 
changes in American federalism in climate change, a lack of national action in other 
environmental issues has resulted in extremely successful multilevel collaboration in the 
past. For instance, Goldshore describes how hazardous waste regulation in the 1980s in 
New Jersey required action from all levels of government.166 The “Siting Law” required 
local involvement and notice in the siting of hazardous waste facilities, and it resulted in 
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more successful environmental regulation.167 Thus, even though the study of multilevel 
analysis is relatively new, multiple levels of government have been working together for 
decades on environmental issues. Still, while the analysis of multilevel governance has 
been used for many policy areas over the last few decades, this innovative approach is 
essential in order to sufficiently respond to the unique political difficulties of climate 
change in particular.  
This theoretical lens provides a helpful analysis into the ways states limit and 
encourage city climate action as well as the ways in which cities influence and prompt 
state climate action. By looking beyond national directives and focusing on what has 
been described as “America’s bottom-up climate change mitigation policy,” some 
scholars have found that the “US has been more committed to climate change mitigation 
than is generally acknowledged.”168 While this conclusion is certainly debated in the 
literature, the recognition of efforts at all levels of government as well as by private 
actors shows a very different political system than the common perception of cities, states 
and national government acting, and often failing, in isolation. 
The lens of multilevel governance also helps to show the increased role of 
decentralized action in climate policy through its increased reliance on community 
stakeholders. Scholar Robin Hambleton focuses on this point through his understanding 
of the term “governance.” As noted previously, he defines this term as “government plus 
the looser processes of influencing and negotiating with a range of public and private 
sector agencies.”169 He finds that this form of rule and policy “encourages collaboration 
between public, private and nonprofit sectors” and can be seen as “shifting responsibility 
from the state onto the private and voluntary sectors and civil society in general.”170 
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Likewise, Kjaer defines governance as the increasing combination of politicians, 
administrators, state and society actors over the last twenty years.171 Hambleton believes 
that this increased collaboration between non-state and state actors in governance has 
direct impacts on policy, leading to “increased attention on issues relating to 
governmental legitimacy, citizen empowerment and the vibrancy of civil society.”172 
These predictions show an amplification of the local framing and community targeting 
described in Section 2. This increased importance of local attention and non-
governmental actors is reflected in the academic literature. Some scholars acknowledge 
the significance of these factors by including them in their own understandings of the 
horizontal dimension of multilevel governance. While this paper will follow the trend of 
Lee, Betsill and Bulkeley by confining the understanding of horizontal dimension to state 
actors, the role of stakeholders and community influence will continue to be discussed.173 
The sections below provide the argument for my finding that American cities do 
not create climate policy in isolation and that each success or struggle connects into 
superordinate actions. The abstract concept of multilevel governance is fully realized in 
climate policy, and as academics note, “There is a growing recognition that a climate deal 
in the foreseeable future is likely to encompass both top-down and bottom-up initiatives 
in an outcome that tries to balance both global ambition and domestic appetite for 
action.”174 This section attempts to make sense of this complicated political environment 
in order to find the city’s place within it. 
In order to test these arguments, each of Kern and Mol’s three dimensions will be 
examined in turn with respect to city climate change policy. The hierarchical dimension 
can result in a state both limiting as well as encouraging city policy. The horizontal 
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dimension describes the unique benefits of municipal networks, both regionally and 
internationally. The vertical dimension of multilevel governance is demonstrated in the 
ways that the city influences the higher levels of government, generally in form of 
positive influence through innovation and direct political leadership. 
 Throughout this section, analysis will generally focus on the relationship between 
the city and state as it relates to climate policy rather than expanding to the national level. 
This is both because national government plays a notably smaller role in environmental 
issues due to the structure of American federalism and because state interactions with city 
politics are simply better studied. This conclusion is affirmed in Ohlhorst’s study of the 
German federal government when she finds that, “The national government is in a 
considerably weaker position in terms of its influence with regard to the implementation 
of sustainable energy policy… compared to that of non-federally organized nation 
states.”175 Similarly, the decentralized system of American government relies on the 
states to take a larger role. Thus, while key contributions from the national government 
will be noted, a larger analysis is beyond the reach of this paper, and findings will 
generally be based on state influence. 
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Section 4: Hierarchical Dimensions of Multilevel Governance  
As mentioned previously, the hierarchical dimension of multilevel governance focuses on 
the way that cities implement the top-down policies set by higher levels of 
government.176 In this way, the framework multilevel governance helps to show the 
remaining influences of the hierarchical element of American federalism even as climate 
change suffers from a lack of centralized action overall. In the context of climate policy, 
this aspect of the city-state relationship can both limit and encourage city action.  
4.A Top-Down Control: Limiting City Actions 
Background 
While many states have relatively favorable environmental policy, often times the 
structure of American government creates institutional barriers that apply regardless of 
the political tendencies of the state. In other words, even the most progressive states will 
sometimes limit city action due to their distinct places in American federalist 
government. That being said, states can still influence the balance of this relationship in 
order to act more or less favorably towards climate policy in cities. So a state that 
strongly pushes against climate change policy, such as Texas, may exploit these structural 
barriers in order to repress city action while a state that has demonstrated leadership in 
environmental issues, such as California, may try to reduce the extent of these limitations.  
Table 1 shows a rough categorization of the states that: A) generally lead climate 
and environmental policy; B) generally exert a small but positive influence on climate 
and environmental policy; C) generally are indifferent or inactive on climate and 
environmental policy; and D) generally reject climate and environmental policy. As each 
state government can create climate policy in both explicit (i.e. state climate plans) and 
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implicit (i.e. state housing policy, energy programs, etc.) ways, it is difficult to produce 
an accurate ranking simply from investigating state policy. While countries have been 
ranked repeatedly for their climate actions, there is a clear lack of well-analyzed state 
rankings in academic work. For these reasons, the categorization integrates the results of 
five studies that rank or measure various aspects of a state’s climate as well as 
environmental policy and performance.177 Each study’s results were divided into 5 
categories ranked 1 to 5 where 5 is the highest ranking. Thus the worst possible overall 
score was a 5 and the best possible overall score was a 25.  
Efforts often do not necessarily translate into performance for a variety of external 
factor, and thus these rankings cannot fully explain a particular state’s effort to create 
climate policy, especially as it applies to cities. Even when analyzing the conclusions of 
learned scholars, one must acknowledge that their conclusions are generalizations of a 
highly diverse set of states. In addition to varying based on their own commitments to 
environmental issues, states also vary in the distribution of autonomous power between 
their own government and municipalities. American states have significant independence 
in creating their own constitutions, and these constitutions set the jurisdictions of the city 
and state, making the autonomy of local government more varied between these states.178 
Similarly, the entire basis of Frug and Barron’s argument is that each state structures its 
cities in a very unique way, and these differences have large impacts on the power 
balance in the city-state relationship.179 Instead of attempting to determine the detailed 
impacts of each state’s constitution and stated efforts on climate, Table 1 illustrates a 
more general summary of state climate policy thus far, and hence, it provides an 
estimation of the state’s level of support for action at the city level relevant to this study.  
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Category States 
States that lead environmental and climate 
policy (Scores 17-20) 
CA, CT, MA, MD, ME, NH, NY, OR, VT 
WA 
States that exert a small but positive 
influence on climate and environmental 
policy (Scores 13-16) 
CO, FL, HI, MI, MN, NJ, PA, RI, WI 
States that are indifferent or inactive on 
climate and environmental policy (Scores 
8-12) 
AK, AZ, DE, GA, IL, NC, OH, SC, TX, 
UT, TN, WV, VA 
States that reject oppose climate and 
environmental policy (Scores 4-7) 
AL, AR, IA, ID, IN, KS, KY, LA, MO, 
MS, MT, ND, NE, NM, NV, OK, SD, WY 
Table 1: An estimation of American states’ commitment to climate and 
environmental action.180 
 
While cities can look to states to reduce these structural barriers, even the most 
progressive of states, such as Massachusetts and New York, limit city action through 
their supreme jurisdiction over important policy areas and control of funding. Cheung, 
Davies and Truck recognize these same issues as what they defined to be the three largest 
barriers to city action: subservience to state and national government, the need to fulfill 
traditional and daily obligations before new policy areas, and financial constraints.181  
Jurisdiction 
This first obstacle refers to the division of power within any federalist 
government, which gives cities significantly less authority over important infrastructure. 
Without control over high-emitting operations like public transportation or energy 
sourcing, cities cannot mitigate their carbon emissions as easily as state or national 
government. In the words of Mia Goldwasser, a Climate Preparedness Program Manager 
from Boston, “The city and the state and the federal government have different 
jurisdictions… So a lot of the city’s role is pretty limited actually.”182 She noted that the 
control over large infrastructure was a significant factor in determining the policy options 
open to the city, a thought affirmed by several authors.183 Similarly, Carl Spector, the 
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Commissioner of the Environment Department in Boston, noted that city climate action 
relies on state programs, especially in areas where the city lacks control and can take 
advantage of programs that the state has already put in place on areas like energy 
efficiency.184  
However, scholarly literature indicates a large tension about the amount of 
autonomy and independence at the city level. Some writers, such as Krause and Kantor, 
focus on the relative level of independence that cities maintain in a decentralized 
government system.185 As mentioned previously, Kantor and his colleagues find that 
while technically state governments have ultimate control over their cities, in practice 
“states delegate considerable policy authority to local governments… The effect is that 
localities exercise major influence over some of the most vital policy areas, such as land 
use, police, education, housing and roads.”186 Similarly, Bulkeley states that: “Most 
municipalities have been found to have at least a degree of partial autonomy over the 
governing of climate change locally.”187 In contrast to this positive view of decentralized 
government, Barber argues that cities have more authority due to the ironic nature of 
sovereignty.188 He argues that because countries are accountable to the cities within, they 
are less free to take drastic climate action. Instead, cities that technically lack sovereignty 
are responsible only to themselves so they may be more willing to take those same bold 
steps to take action on climate change.189 
Still, most sources made concessions that ultimately and legally the state has 
power over its cities. For all his claims about the power of the city and about the lack of 
power at the state, Barber acknowledged that cities “lie within the jurisdiction and 
sovereignty of superior political bodies” and are thus “compelled to listen” to their 
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states.190 The majority of writers seem to think that cities are limited by their lack of 
jurisdiction, creating a “problem of fit” in institutional capacity where the there is a gap 
between “the scale of issues that need to be addressed… and municipal authority.”191 
Resistance to Limited Jurisdiction through Decentralization 
Despite the structural limitations of divisions of power in decentralized 
government, cities can push back on issues of jurisdiction in several ways. The first way 
is through the inherent reciprocity in decentralized government. For instance, because 
states and national government rely on local governments to implement their initiatives, 
cities maintain a fair amount of control over the application of these national policies.192 
In addition, as historical examples demonstrated in Section 3, cities are often willing to 
push back against higher levels of government that may technically have more authority. 
Corrie takes this analysis a step further and notes that while “the division of regulatory 
power between state and local governments determines the permissible extent of local 
participation in environmental regulation,” municipal governments often have an 
“alternative power framework known as home rule,” wherein they claim exclusive 
authority over local affairs.193 In another form of direct opposition, both cities and states 
have used litigation in recent years to pressure the national government into action on 
carbon emissions. 194  This active resistance to larger state control is a trend of 
decentralized government that has become only more pronounced as cities try to gain 
more control over important areas of regulation.  
New York City provides an extreme example of this dispute over jurisdiction due 
to its multiple centers of power vying for control. First, state control in the region is split 
between New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.195 Almost every significant regional 
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issue will ascend to these three powerful states, but New York City demonstrates that 
cities can maintain a relatively high amount of power even within structural limits.196 For 
instance, Kantor and his colleagues claim: “Although state governments have legal 
supremacy, the enormous size, economic power, and importance of New York City 
create political rivalry and interdependency between city and state policy makers.”197 
Similarly, New York City also demonstrates the way in which a city can utilize its limited 
authority to become a larger power. The city’s strong local control over land use has 
made it nearly impossible to pass region-wide policy changes from a national level, 
demonstrating how even a city facing structural constraints can yield a larger amount of 
power and find ways to enact its climate initiatives.198 Although she spoke in Boston, Mia 
Goldwasser, the city’s Climate Preparedness program Manager, explained this 
phenomenon by saying that the city’s official range of options and control may be 
limited, but “it can exert influence in those places.”199  
City Policies Shaped by Limited Jurisdiction 
As mentioned in Section 2.F, city strategies will be shaped by the policy areas in 
which they have the most authority to actually influence, whether that be to limit 
emissions or to adapt to climate change. In this way, city actions will differ greatly from 
those taken at other levels of government. While countries and states can create treaties 
or mandatory regulations, local government lack the authority to take equivalent action. 
For example, Figure 1, an image taken from the Boston Climate Action Plan,200 
demonstrates that the city of Boston has the most control over buildings, emergency 
response and land use while having very little authority over emissions-heavy  
transportation and energy as well as resiliency-relevant water infrastructure. Although 
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this chart is specific to Massachusetts, many of its splits illustrated in this Figure likely 
are shared by other states and cities across the US.  
Figure 1: Split Jurisdiction within Boston 
Cities are partially limited in the actions they can take by their lower jurisdiction, 
but instead of becoming inactive on climate policy, local governments have developed 
several unique strategies to take action and overcome this barrier, including persuasion 
and incentives, creative action and a local focus.  Although many academics mention 
specific policies or programs in their studies on city climate action, there is not much 
analytic or comparative research, and thus these three categories of new action emerged 
from interviews with Boston and New York City officials. A more in-depth description of 
city strategies can be found in Section 2, but the following actions function as a local 
response to limited jurisdiction. 
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First, in their day-to-day functioning, cities lack the centralized control of either a 
national planning agency or of an emergency response team. One Boston organization 
employee noted that this is a particularly difficult obstacle because climate change 
impacts in the city are often related closely to natural disasters that are traditionally under 
the control of centralized planning agencies. Instead, municipalities act as more 
decentralized and equal leaders that work to persuade their constituents to take certain 
positive actions to respond to climate change. For instance, Kern and Bulkeley define the 
need for internal and oft government in their claim: “In the absence of the usual forms of 
authority afforded to governmental actors in hierarchical relations of power – i.e. 
regulation, sanction and force – networks rely on other forms of authority and 
persuasion.” 201 Barber takes a more ideological perspective when he concludes that 
mayors are “compelled to persuade rather than to enact and order, to debate rather than 
proclaim and pontificate… Declaring not their independence, but their interdependence, 
they build not walls but ports and portals.”202 This quote references the importance of 
accessibility described in Section 2.G. Once persuaded to participate, community actors 
play important roles in a city’s climate change policy. Sections 2.D and 2.F provide 
examples to demonstrate the value of these local actors as experts or targets of city 
action. In a tangible example, both Boston and New York City have experimented with 
competitions like the Living with Water or Trash Free NYC Waters to gain community 
input and investment into a city project. Similarly, Boston’s Greenovate program initially 
began as a rewards program to encourage environmental leaders in the community.203 
Farther South, DC uses a voluntary and incentive-based program to provide discounts 
and rebates to property owners who invest in green infrastructure.204 
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Local governments have also found some very creative and innovative strategies 
to overcome barriers from limited jurisdiction. As Jessica Feldish, a Program Manager 
for Community Engagement in Boston, stated, “I would say that we as a city… within 
our resources we can get more creative” than equivalent departments at higher levels of 
government.205 For example, DC established a trading system of Stormwater Retention 
Credits (SRCs) to encourage large development projects to install green infrastructure 
like cisterns, rain gardens, green roofs and permeable pavement.206 While most cities 
cannot set the kinds of building codes that would require these actions, innovative 
programs like the SRCs allow them to prompt these changes. Local governments have 
more control over building construction than other carbon-intensive policy areas (See 
Figure 1), and thus creative actions seem to focus on this area of city governance. Betsill 
remarks that a municipality can cut carbon emissions by enhancing building energy 
efficiency through codes and ordinances, and Boston proves her point with the Stretch 
Building Code. 207  While Massachusetts controls the building code, the city has 
jurisdiction over the zoning code. In an example of true collaboration between state and 
city actors like those found in Section 4.B, these two levels of government created an 
optional code with more stringent energy efficiency requirements. 208  Carl Spector 
described it as a “state initiative that gave an option to cities,” and while this action did 
not come solely from the city, it helps to illustrate the innovative ways that local 
governments are overcoming the limits of their authority.209 
Last, city response to climate change generally uses a heavily local focus and 
relies on municipal resources and infrastructure. While some reasons for this framing are 
described in Section 2, this local perspective also allows the city to take many actions 
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fully within its jurisdiction. Early in city action on climate change, this focus took shape 
as cities worked to reduce the carbon emissions from their municipal buildings and 
infrastructure. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) finds that this effort to move 
ones own operations toward climate-neutrality is a primary way for cities to reduce 
climate impacts, and similarly Krause concluded that early city actions were focused on 
municipal operations. 210 Jessica Feldish from Boston spoke about the application of this 
theory in the city’s first climate action plan, finding that it “was really only focused on 
the city's own assets and… what the city of Boston can control, like our own fleet, our 
own buildings, energy efficiency and so all the buildings that the city owns.”211 
Furthermore, local focus can lead to an emphasis on adaptation policies, as discussed in 
Section 2.F. As shown in Figure 1, many aspects of daily utilities operations and 
emergency response can be under the control of cities. As these areas are strongly 
impacted by climate change, they provide an important opportunity for a city’s first steps 
to take action.  
In addition, this local focus can also be combined with the use of persuasive 
programs to increase voluntary stakeholder participation. Section 2.F provides concrete 
examples of this previously untapped group of human resources. Betsill and Bulkeley 
take a new theoretical approach to this community engagement, finding that just as 
different levels of government have different spheres of authority, stakeholders have their 
own.212 By accessing these local actors, municipalities can effectively increase their 
jurisdiction to include both spheres of authority. 
In addition to these three main pathways shaped by jurisdiction, other strategies 
are also able to overcome these inherent jurisdictional limits, such as participation in 
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larger intra-city networks (described in Section 5.C). Overall, cities are not only able to 
get around limited jurisdiction but able to find new opportunities for community 
engagement generally not available at the state level. Thus, city actions can focus on 
policy areas that are neglected in state and national action. Rather than serve as a 
judgment on the emphases of these higher levels of government, this demonstrates the 
essential and equivalent contributions of city action in the larger American response to 
climate change. 
Concluding Thoughts on Jurisdiction 
Overall, it is clear that local jurisdiction over key regulatory areas is hotly 
contested, both in reality and in literature. While Barber’s analysis is often tainted with an 
idealistic bias, his description of this tension is quite accurate: the “continuing war over 
American federalism and the appropriate vertical distribution of power.”213 Similarly, 
while cities are legally bound to obey their sovereign laws, they are “at liberty to act in 
cases where superior jurisdictions are indifferent.” 214  This debate results remains 
unresolved, resulting in an unclear, and thus amenable, status about the city’s jurisdiction 
and independence.  
Despite this lack of resolution, there are several key takeaways from this debate. 
First, in order for a local government to take firm action on climate change, a city must 
be able to overcome the limits on its jurisdiction over key policy areas, either by 
increasing its power or finding new tactics. As Pressman writes, “Few mayors have 
formal authority and resources which are adequate to deal with the enormous tasks facing 
them. But this is not considered an insuperable obstacle.”215 Cities are able to circumvent 
the limitations of their jurisdiction by finding these alternate methods of rule, whether 
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that be through persuasion, creative policy or a local focus. These local actors develop 
their “spheres of authority” in order to maintain a strong response to climate change. 
Second, the decentralized form of government allows for flexibility and city action to 
change its structural rules, creating what one city official called a “constant give-and-
take” and providing the opportunity for significant political leadership.216 Third, authors 
suggest that the best remedy for this dispute between the levels of government is to 
engage in stronger multilevel governance and vertical coordination between these 
levels.217 It is this final path that most cities are now leaning towards and that will 
continue to be tested throughout the rest of this paper. 
Control of Funding 
In addition to these insights from issues of jurisdiction, the second two obstacles 
from Cheung, fulfilling regular obligations and financial constraints, can be grouped 
together in the larger issue of funding and prioritizing. Scholars such as Betsill, Bulkeley, 
Krause, Corfee-Morlot and his colleagues argue that both human and financial capacity 
are important factors for determining if a city will act on climate change, especially if 
established as an institutional department within local government.218 A C40 report 
states, “the city government struggles to demonstrate the financial case for a climate 
action or to have the financial autonomy to employ appropriate fund-raising 
mechanisms.”219 This means that cities struggle to finance their own projects, often 
relying on state or national resources. Likewise, both Alan Cohn in NYC and Jessica 
Feldish in Boston acknowledged the difficulty of meeting their potential success in 
climate action due to limited staff and resources.220 The New York City Department of 
Environmental Protection gains much of its funding from the ratepayers, but this amount 
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pales in comparison to the financial resources available to state and national 
government.221 Overall, sources of government funding are often limited, especially for 
new initiatives. Funding for adaptation efforts is especially limited as 76% of global 
finance for climate change is dedicated to mitigation efforts.222 Even when national 
funding is granted following a natural disaster, it is often insufficient to resolve the costs 
of climate change223 and often must be spent quickly without allowing good time for 
planning.224 
In addition to this small amount of funding, regulators at state levels often 
prescribe its use according to their own priorities.225 For example, Boston acquires much 
of its funding from the state, but that comes with “certain requirements and 
restrictions.”226  In a similar way, the state enforcement of national and state regulations 
like the CWA and CAA may consume a large portion of a city’s budget, leaving nothing 
to invest in new policy areas like climate change mitigation. This point was further 
affirmed by John Brock from the Integrated Water Management Group within the 
Department of Environmental Protection for New York City. He stated that while his 
department attempts to approach things in line with New York City’s OneNYC platform 
on climate change and resiliency, but “as an agency… a lot of it is driven by getting in 
compliance with the state regulations and federal regulations.”227 The officials described 
how they try to balance compliance with investing in new climate initiatives, but often 
compliance gets prioritized because it is required by state or national law, whereas 
climate initiatives are primarily motivated by their own cost-saving, climate resilient or 
innovative benefits.228  
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City Policies Shaped by Limited Funding 
 Local governments have also initiated new tactics to get around this limited 
funding, and Pressman, Beal and Pinson claim that this search for new resources and 
financial outputs will only increase with declining state support.229 Cities both search for 
cheaper tactics and for new and creative sources of funding.  
First, persuasive action and soft governance again provide a mechanism for 
avoiding this barrier as these generally require less funding to be successful. 
Competitions like those described above need very little input from government officials 
once they are established. Community engagement programs that seek out voluntary 
compliance will likewise have very little regulatory expense.  
Furthermore, this limited funding encourages local government officials to frame 
their policies in terms of their economic co-benefits rather than simply as a solution for 
climate change issues. This framing is described in depth in Section 2.E. Demonstrating 
these secondary impacts allows a policy to gain public support, even if funding and 
general belief in climate change is low. For instance, local governments may have more 
success convincing city budgetary committees to put limited resources towards 
adaptation due to its long-term cost effectiveness. This is because adaptation efforts tend 
to be cheaper while Hurricane Sandy alone cost the US close to $50 billion.230 As a C40 
report puts it, “A large body of research shows that timely land-use planning and climate-
proof city design measures are often significantly more cost-effective than future urgent, 
reactive and uncoordinated responses to sea level rise.”231 The need to demonstrate co-
benefits as well as to provide convincing cost-benefit analyses pushes the city towards 
certain strategies and framings. 
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 Second, as cities lack the ability to increase their funds through traditional 
government processes like taxes, they must look to creative sources of funding to support 
climate initiatives. A C40 report argues that local governments are “using alternative 
financial mechanisms that support and incentivize action, such as bonds, tolls and 
developer contributions.”232 New York City in particular has been a pioneer in tapping 
nontraditional sources of funding, using bond issuance to build its own finances.233 In 
addition, in order to encourage buffer wetlands after Hurricane Sandy, the city used a 
one-time federal recovery grant to establish a sustainable program on mitigation 
banking.234 Furthermore, participation in large formal networks can also provide access 
to grants and direct assistance, as described in Section 5.C below. Likewise, the potential 
to access state finances and resources described in Section 4.B may push a municipality 
to seek out collaborations with the state. These examples show how a city could 
overcome this obstacle of lower resources by capitalizing the ones it does have and 
finding new savings and sources of funding.  
Concluding Thoughts on State Limits 
In this way, even a progressive state can still be trapped by the law and its role in 
decentralized government, requiring the state to direct the funding of city departments to 
non-climate projects. The lack of a national regulation on climate issues causes the 
breakdown in traditional decentralized government, leaving city departments unable to 
act. For example, Alan Cohn noted that the NYC DEP had to defer its investments to 
reduce flooding in Queens because “we’ve been so driven by the regulatory requirements 
that we’re investing all of our money in… complying with regulations instead of 
mitigation the issues in that community.”235 As a result, these city officials search for 
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innovative ways to get “ahead of” state regulation, always trying to get beyond their 
control in order to have enough funding to place in their own priority of resiliency.236 The 
results of this limiting relationship will be described in further detail in Section 6: 
Vertical Influence. 
Overall, the jurisdiction and control of funding by the state often limits city 
climate initiatives, leaving them significantly disadvantaged when compared to their state 
or national counterparts. However, as the examples above demonstrate, cities can evade 
these disadvantages through creative and innovative tactics not previously attempted at 
other levels of government, thus both filling a unique role and providing equally 
important contributions to the US climate effort. 
4.B Top-Down Control: Encouraging City Actions 
Background 
In addition to the ways that a state can limit the city, the hierarchical dimension of 
multilevel governance also can play out through state encouragement of city climate 
action. Supportive states can use their powers and resources in ways to both specifically 
require as well as softly incentivize cities to enact policy on climate change issues, acting 
as a key origin of urban climate policy. Lukas Hakelberg summarizes this action when he 
writes, “Superordinate governments can also promote local action on climate change 
through leadership, expertise and funding.”237 This positive influence seems natural given 
the widely publicized climate policy taken by certain states, such the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in New England238 and California’s characteristic 
leadership. 
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Still, while every state in the US has at least one program designed to increase 
energy efficiency or promote renewable energy, 239 it is clear that some states promote 
city climate action much more than others (see Table 1). The two focus states for this 
study, Massachusetts and New York, are both in the highest category of support for 
climate action, and thus the importance of the city’s relationship to the state was 
emphasized in many interviews with city officials. For instance, Carl Spector, the 
Commissioner of the Environment Department in Boston, casually noted that he talks 
frequently with his colleagues at the state, demonstrating the familiarity and stability of 
the city’s relationship with Massachusetts government.240 Still, many cities such as 
Austin or Miami sit within the boundaries of states that are indifferent, if not hostile, to 
climate policy. Given the range of state support for climate action, the conclusions of the 
following section about state encouragement of an urban response to climate change are 
limited to those states that provide strong leadership or a more moderate positive force. 
In contrast to the vast amount of literature on the controls and limits states set on 
cities, there seems to be very little academic research that directly analyzes the 
environmentally positive impact that a state can have on a city. Still, examples of 
assistance from the state abound, demonstrating that many progressive states promote and 
support city climate action. This encouragement is realized in three main ways: direct 
mandates, provision of resources and incentives, and true collaboration. 
Direct Mandates 
First, state mandates on a city can force a city to expand its climate response with 
its inherently superior jurisdiction over urban affairs, using the high level of control 
described in Section 4.A above for an opposite goal. This is a modern demonstration of 
Florack 
74 
the principles of a hierarchical system relying on decentralized implementation, described 
earlier as American federalism. For instance, in California the “state Attorney General 
began requiring local governments to consider GHG emissions in their general plan 
updates in 2007,” suing noncompliant municipalities.241 Such mandates can also have far-
reaching consequences, such as when state legislation in Florida ordering the 
prioritization of renewable energy and energy conservation activities significantly 
delayed a plan by four cities to invest in a coal plant.242 Often times these “mandates are 
not especially popular with local governments” due to this level of control.243 Even 
though they “rarely involve harsh financial or legal sanctions,” cities can be penalized for 
noncompliance by the threat of lawsuit or ineligibility for state grants.244 However, some 
progressive cities may actually appreciate the sense of requirement and urgency that a 
state mandate brings to their agenda. As Dalton and Barby write, the “overlooked 
advantage of state or federal mandates – even weak ones – is that they can provide 
effective “cover” to local officials seeking to tackle difficult planning issues As one 
respondent in a conservative community noted, ‘Being able to say ‘It’s required by state 
law’ makes it easier to sell local action to our city council.’”245 In this way, these top-
down requirements can be received both positively and negatively by a city, even while 
the ultimate goal of increasing climate policy is advanced.  
Provision of Resources and Incentives 
The second form of direct encouragement for climate policy relies on the 
distribution of funds and resources, and often this kind of aid is well-received and 
appreciated by cities. In many ways, grants allow superordinate levels of government to 
take a “hands-off” approach by intentionally targeting cities and motivating them to take 
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climate action on their own terms. Establishing a financial encouragement rather than 
exacting a punishment, the benefits of state or national funding are frequently mentioned 
in official documents for city climate action. For example, New York City’s Department 
of Environmental Protection (DEP) used a national EPA grant to create a community-
engagement project to reduce the number of plastic bags in waterways, and Boston used a 
state grant to create a design competition to make infrastructure next to bodies of water 
more resilient.246 Many climate actions in Boston can trace their success back to state and 
national grants. For instance, national grants from Sustainable Communities and 
Homeland Security enabled the expansion of the Metropolitan Area Planning Council to 
cover energy issues. 247  The list of ways that Massachusetts provides funding for 
sustainable city actions goes on and on as well.248  
Sometimes these state grant programs are explicitly related to climate action. For 
example, the Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Management’s Coastal Community 
Resilience Grant Program gave Boston $350,000 in 2015 to support climate preparedness 
efforts.249 However, some state grant programs seem to be more indirectly focused on 
climate change efforts, even while using the direct approach of providing funding. For 
instance, a study on New Orleans’ climate resiliency received funding support from the 
state’s Office of Community Development.250 This example also helps to demonstrate 
how a state that is generally inactive on climate change may have particular agencies or 
individuals who support its implementation at lower levels. Similarly, the city of New 
Orleans received a national grant for this project: the HUD’s National Disaster Resilience 
Competition.251 The title of this project did not clearly indicate it was meant for climate, 
suggesting a way that even national agencies supporting climate change are able to create 
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action and assistance from a generally inactive level of government. Often times these 
grants are not required by any form of legislation, indicating that the policy-making 
decision to assist lower efforts at climate action may come from another actor within the 
state or national government. In this way, the state agency offering these funding 
opportunities works to support cities even when other branches of government are 
inactive.  
Even when financial opportunities are required by new top-down mandates, like 
those described in the section above, cities have more flexibility in realizing these grants. 
As Susan Cascino, the Director of Recycling for Boston, noted: a state that relies on a 
municipality to carry out its laws cannot put out an unfunded mandate.252 In this way, 
cities like Boston were required to answer a state initiative, but had more flexibility to 
design their own programs to meet grant funding requirements. 253  For example, 
Massachusetts placed a ban on commercial food waste in 2014 that subsequently 
established a grant program to find funding for projects that would achieve this goal.254 In 
response, cities would be able to design their own plans rather than simply obey strict 
mandates, often producing more innovative responses, an advantage discussed further 
below in Section 6.  
Similar to this area of funding, states can assist city climate action by permitting 
and encouraging the use of state resources. While this kind of aid is not as well 
documented, the Metro Boston Regional Climate Change Adaptation Strategy notes two 
key examples. First, an internet-based resource that helps to manage changing coastal 
floodplain challenges was created by the Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone 
Management and has been used fairly extensively by the region surrounding Boston.255 A 
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second example describes the information and tools provided by the EPA Climate Ready 
Estuaries Program and their use to help develop adaptation plans.256 Overall, funding and 
resources given by the state allow cities to more flexible by choosing to act on the 
opportunities they want, even while providing them with direct assistance. These 
resources are extremely valuable to cities, and allow cities (like Boston and New York 
City) that have already established a history of climate action to expand their reach. 
True Collaboration 
Last, states can encourage cities to enact policy on climate change issues through 
more explicit efforts for collaboration between the levels of government, demonstrating a 
practical example of the complex relationships of multilevel governance. Again, there is 
very little analysis of these efforts within academic literature, but there are so many 
examples of this occurring that I only have space to note the actions within a few key 
cities. For example, often this collaborative effort takes place in designing plans together, 
as occurred in the adaptation plans both in New Orleans and the Metro-Boston area.257 
Resilience efforts in particular require the participation of a large range of state, city and 
non-governmental actors. Axum Teferra, an Energy Planner for the Metropolitan Area 
Planning Council (MAPC) in Boston and Manager of the Metro Boston Climate 
Preparedness Taskforce, acknowledged this need for wide-spread support, sharing that 
the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA), Massachusetts Department of 
Transportation (MassDOT) and other state agencies participate in MAPC projects and the 
Metro Boston Climate Preparedness Taskforce.258 Similarly, New York City has worked 
directly with its superordinate levels of government on energy efficiency initiatives, and 
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the recycling program in Boston works closely with the state Department of 
Environmental Protection.259  
This mutually engaging relationship between the city and state is best illustrated 
in the optional building Stretch Code in Boston, already described for its creativity in 
Section 4.A. As noted previously, traditional jurisdiction divisions in Massachusetts give 
the state authority over the building code, which can require certain levels of energy 
efficiency.260 The support at the state level is not yet strong enough to increase the energy 
efficiency requirement for all cities, and yet many local governments wanted to be able to 
enforce a stricter version within their limits. Carl Spector described the collaboration 
when the state decided to establish an additional “stretch code” that cities could opt into, 
receiving the encouragement and support of many cities.261 This example demonstrates 
that collaboration can allow cities to step beyond their traditional jurisdiction and access 
some of the authority of the state. This complex and reciprocal exchange of influence and 
authority practically demonstrates the theoretical framework of multilevel governance. 
Overall, while the other methods that a state uses to push cities to take climate action are 
important, these examples of true collaboration better demonstrates the interdependence 
of cities and states within a system of multilevel governance.  
Concluding Thoughts 
These three paths of state encouragement have had great impacts in prompting 
city climate action. Scholars note that while the most comprehensive climate policy 
efforts have come from the voluntary actions by local governments, “many of the specific 
actions extending to the community level reflect years of prodding by state government,” 
including energy efficiency, waste management programs and expansion of renewable 
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energy.262 While there are still many states that do not actively promote climate action as 
well as many cities that lead their states in environmental policy, the positive influence of 
states can impact a city in different ways within the larger system of multilevel 
governance.  
As Ohlhorst argues, “The interactive dynamics in policy-making are interpreted 
as positive policy feedbacks, triggering the mobilization of resources, incentives, and 
information for political actors by encouraging ambitions and increasing commitment.”263 
While proving the accuracy of this claim is beyond the scope of this paper, this statement 
shows some of the scholarly support for the positive influences of the hierarchical 
dimension of multilevel governance. Similarly, other authors even note that a lack of 
policy mandates from state governments act as a large barrier to city climate action, thus 
showing that state encouragement cannot be undervalued. 264  Krause even names 
adherence to state regulations or legislation as the third most important factor to causing 
successful action on climate, following the factors of framing and policy entrepreneurs.265 
Often any effort of state leadership can promote related climate action in cities, an idea 
Carl Spector reinforced when he mentioned how certain initiatives by the state, such as 
participating in RGGI or passing the Global Warming Solutions Act (GWSA), “helps 
us.”266 
Overall, in these three main ways, distinctively strong climate action at the state 
and national level, whether legislative or within agencies, often spurs the city to do the 
same. Daniel Zarrilli, the senior director of climate policy and programs in New York 
City, summarized this relationship. “We certainly have had good partnership over the last 
eight years… But we have a lot of things we can do on our own, and we can even 
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accelerate our own efforts to make sure that we do pick up some of the slack.”267 
Building on the discussion of partnerships, both mandatory and voluntary, between cities 
and superordinate levels of government. Section 6 will approach this relationship from 
the opposite direction, examining how a city may lead and encourage its state to act on 
climate change.  
4.C Concluding Thoughts on the Hierarchical Dimension 
The hierarchical relationship between levels of government in American politics 
can serve to limit or advance the progress of city climate action, demonstrating how these 
public actors can work together as well as against each other. The impacts of these 
disputes over jurisdiction and funding as well as the weight of a state’s support for 
climate policy can trigger a new city policy or vastly shape a city’s strategy. For example, 
the New York City DEP actively strives to get ahead of the state in order to have the 
freedom to use its funding based on its own plans rather than being driven by 
regulations.268  
  While the hierarchical relationship between the city and the state depends on the 
unique characteristics of the state, the structure of decentralization and multilevel 
governance constitute the common foundation of this relationship across all cities and 
states. In just the same way, the conflicts and collaboration in the city-state relationship 
are based on this same system. Decentralization creates the inherently unequal 
relationship between these levels of government, which can become strained when “both 
these levels have regulatory powers over the same activity” and one level has a different 
objective.269 Often times, higher levels of government are simply silent on climate 
change, thus reducing this tension, but when cities and their superordinate levels of 
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government come into conflict, cities still often find a way to demonstrate their “home 
rule.” Still, a lack of action at the highest levels undermines the traditional political 
process of American federalism, leaving progressive states to find their own ways to 
prompt action at local levels of government and provide funding for new projects. This 
increased importance of decentralization culminates in the growth of truly collaborative 
projects between the city and state, derailing the system of strict decentralization and 
increasing the complexity of multilevel governance.  
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Section 5: Horizontal Dimensions: City Networks and Collaboration 
5.A Horizontal Relationships in Multilevel Governance and Decentralization 
A common misconception is that municipal governments are only concerned with 
their own people and resources, and while Section 2 provides numerous examples of this 
local focus, many cities in the United States are also involved in both international and 
regional networks and collaborative relationships to combat climate change. In fact, 30% 
of climate actions around the world in 2015 were involved in collaboration with other 
cities.270 There are many kinds of horizontal relationships including formal networks, ad-
hoc or informal networks, project collaboration, informal discussion between city leaders 
and one-on-one collaborative partnerships. Using a multilevel governance lens, these 
collaborative efforts and relationships fit into the horizontal dimension.271  
There is a great variety in the types and emphases of these networks, but those 
studied in this section are defined by the following characteristics. First, although 
scholars debate whether or not non-state actors are a part of the horizontal dimension, this 
paper will only analyze the relationships between municipal governments, following the 
example of Lee, Betsill and Bulkeley.272 Similarly, horizontal relationships exist between 
governments at the state or province level as well as between countries. This section will 
compare these efforts at superordinate levels of government but still primarily will focus 
on urban relationships. Third, while some kinds of relationships may focus more heavily 
on adaptation as compared to mitigation or vice versa, many aspects of these 
relationships apply to both strategies to combat climate change. For instance, local 
collaborations are more likely to focus on adaptation because of their shared interest in 
regional infrastructure while international collaborations are more likely to emphasize 
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mitigation because it is the most easily translated issue across international borders. Still, 
both regional and international relationships rely on decentralized government and 
increase a city’s vertical influence. This example demonstrates the notion that some 
generalizations can be drawn from almost all city networks combating climate change, 
whether mitigation or adaptation. Thus this paper will only take note of a network’s 
particular focus when relevant to the characteristic in question. Fourth, while regional 
collaborative efforts are analyzed below, scholars are far more interested in international 
networks and thus literature on these relationships primarily has an international focus. 
Similarly, state-to-state regional collaborations have received little attention from 
academic research, and the same goes for informal relationships and collaborations at all 
levels of government. Thus the discussion below will mostly use international, nation-to-
nation formal networks to compare to city collaborations. 
 The horizontal dimension demonstrates some essential characteristics of 
multilevel governance. First, these networks play a crucial role in providing political 
action from a non-traditional source. While hierarchical and vertical dimensions of 
governance have some roots in traditional American federalism, city networks have never 
been utilized to the extent that they play now in the face of climate change. This area is 
fairly new, but just as scholars have focused on multilevel governance for the last 
decade,273 studying networks has become increasingly popular in academic literature. 
Second, the horizontal dimension’s focus on the connections between different cities 
inherently demonstrates the importance of relationships within multilevel governance. 
Third, multilevel governance emphasizes the increase of bottom-up leadership, a concept 
that is nowhere better demonstrated than in a series of networks between cities. To 
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Taedong Lee, these two political models are so inseparable that he begins his analysis by 
looking at city-to-city relationships and then from there acknowledging the characteristics 
of multilevel governance within it.274 He writes, “I conceptualize translocal relations as 
the multilevel and multi-agent governance of local authorities, both within and across 
nation-state boundaries.”275 From this statement, it is clear that some scholars have come 
to inherently associate these networks with multilevel governance.  
The horizontal dimension also demonstrates the increased importance of 
decentralized governance within the American federalist model. For instance, by joining 
in collaborations with other cities and transnational networks, municipalities practicing 
the horizontal dimension look to widely disperse power rather than rely on higher levels 
of government.276 In addition to sharing national power in this way, city networks also 
often use extremely decentralized (using its more general definition) means of decision-
making. However, some scholars argue that this horizontal dimension of multilevel 
governance goes beyond traditional decentralization. Betsill and Bulkeley find that while 
the horizontal system has its roots in federalism, traditional regime theory assumes a top-
down perspective and thus cannot explain transnational networks where local members 
maintain independence and innovate freely. 277  Unlike superordinate levels of 
government, these networks are unable to require members to accept their preferred 
mitigation targets or adaptation strategies, instead relying on voluntary action. For 
instance, a city must commit to reducing carbon emissions by 80% by 2050 in order to 
join the Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance.278 However, this pledge this a purely voluntary 
one rather than an action mandated by superordinate levels of government. Because cities 
opt in and select their own networks, they’re most likely to follow its directives, even 
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without formal authority.279 Even while cities are creating unprecedented levels of 
“bottom-up democracy” by freely establishing and joining their own networks, these 
local governments are also coming to a new level of interdependence.280  
5.B Background 
Superordinate Comparison – International Relationships 
Based on its global impact and widely dispersed origins, climate change is a true 
tragedy of the commons. Given the history of intercontinental treaties to solve other 
wide-ranging issues like bird migration and international maritime disputes, there is a 
general public understanding that international agreements between countries are the 
most essential way to address climate change and the related misconception that this is 
the only solution. 281 In particular, most publicity focuses on the United Nations (UN) as 
the central figure in addressing climate change through the UN Framework for the 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Conferences of the Parties (COP). 
Other nations have established alternative and more successful climate agreements 
beyond the UN, but actions from the American national government have remained 
mostly within the UN and its COP climate negotiations. Despite this international 
attention, these efforts have widely failed to provide any truly effective or long-lasting 
policies in reducing or adapting to climate change.282 The most successful COP occurred 
in Paris in 2015, resulting in a significant climate agreement that is now under threat from 
the possibility of American withdrawal in Trump’s presidency.  
When reading city documents and literature, it seems that many public officials 
and scholars feel that the bonds between local governments replace the mostly 
unsuccessful international networks between countries. As Eduardo Paes, the Mayor of 
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Rio de Janeiro, said about a C40 study, “Importantly, the report provides compelling 
evidence for why city governments have demonstrated an ability to get to grips with 
climate change where others have failed, namely: the ability of mayors to collaborate 
across geographic, political and economic boundaries.”283 Mayor Paes believes that city 
governments are able to engage in networks in ways that higher levels cannot, an opinion 
that appears to be shared by many city officials and academics. Bulkeley summarizes this 
belief: “This (international network) movement has gathered pace significantly since the 
early 2000s because of a growing sense of the failure in international negotiations.”284 
Similarly, Taedong Lee writes on this trend, finding that “locals have begun to interact 
extensively with locals in other parts of the world, bypassing national governments.”285 
Barber goes farther and explains why cities succeed where countries cannot based 
on the concept of sovereignty. He believes that countries attempt to force interdependent 
climate agreements even while staying completely independent, and thus every 
international decision is subject to sovereign veto “either implicitly via the 
noncooperation of powerful states… or explicitly as with the UN Security Council.”286 
For example, despite Obama’s political leadership, the legislative branch of American 
government has rejected almost every United Nations decision, at least partially due to a 
fear of encroachment, and now Trump has vowed to remove the US from several of these 
international agreements.287 In contrast, the city’s inherent lack of jurisdiction compels it 
to cooperate with other local governments, an opinion that will be reexamined in later 
sections.288 While Barber’s theory is not widely shared among scholars, his work 
exemplifies the general feeling of disappointment in country-to-country relationships. 
Florack 
88 
Despite this feeling of superiority in both city officials and scholars, these actors 
may biased towards the policy abilities of this level of government, and thus their claims 
should be read with a skeptical eye. For instance, many urban networks actually have 
their roots in country-to-country networks, suggesting that cities may fit into a larger 
system of international networks rather than simply replacing country-to-country 
relations. ICLEI stemmed from a chapter on local agendas at the Rio Earth Summit in 
1992,289 and the UN helped to launch the Compact of Mayors.290 Furthermore, the very 
nature of climate change as a “tragedy of the commons” necessitates actions from the 
largest players, which in this case are countries. While city networks can certainly 
provide unique advantages to local climate action, these partnerships are just one part of 
the horizontal dimension of multilevel governance, and actors at other levels and 
dimensions are also important.  
Similarly, while in general scholars focus more on states rather than urban efforts, 
state-to-state international networks have largely been ignored by academic study. 
Overall, states seem to be considerably less active in forming international collaborations 
on climate change. Betsill and Rabe find that while these collaborative relationships exist 
at the state level for other issues, international climate networks like Cities for Climate 
Protection (CPP) tend to be unique to municipal climate action.291 Furthermore, there is 
very little academic research on state- and country-based informal relationships and 
partnerships, perhaps because these efforts are less documented and more specific to the 
areas involved. The exception to this general trend is the work of Selink and Vandeveer, 
who described the development of memorandums of understanding between European 
countries and American states.292 While these agreements are not binding, they allow for 
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many of the same benefits as intra-city networks, such as sharing information and 
partnership innovation.293 These state-based relationships merit further research, but for 
now, this analysis will primarily focus on the formal networks between countries unless 
otherwise stated. 
Intergovernmental organizations between countries created effective 
environmental agreements in the past, such as the Montreal Protocol, and agreed on the 
Paris Climate Agreement in 2015, but thus far, these intra-nation networks have been 
unable to stimulate effective action on climate change. As noted above, state-to-state 
partnerships are still fairly undeveloped. However, these organizations between 
superordinate levels of government are able to take part in intra-city networks. For 
instance, the Climate Group reinforces the complex and overlapping dimensions of 
multilevel governance by including both state and regional governments in its 
members.294 With the rise of both city and state international networks, subnational 
authorities have developed their own foreign policies beyond a national government, 
making climate governance a more complex model instead of simply hierarchical.295 
International city networks occupy a unique niche within this larger system, providing a 
specific purpose and set of advantages that are examined below in Sections 5.C and 5.D. 
Background of International City Relationships 
Just as national discussions on climate change focus on international 
relationships, the number of transnational municipal networks (TMNs) and international 
collaborative relationships has been rapidly increasing over the past few decades. This 
trend is particularly significant considering that cities have historically maintained a local 
focus, as noted in Sections 2.E and 2.F. International networks and relationships 
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influence urban governments to use more international framing for their policies, making 
this the exception to the majority of locally-focused policy. Kern and Mol describe this 
changing horizontal dimension when they claim, “Because climate change is a complex 
global problem that requires action at local and regional levels, urban climate governance 
has become highly internationalized.” 296  Similarly, Anguelovski views this 
internationalization as a sign of the maturation of the climate policy area.297 These two 
perspectives demonstrate a commonly held view that these TMNs and international 
relationships are a mark of progress and improving policy actions. 
Overall, international city action tends to be primarily in formal TMNs, and 
academic literature has similarly focused on this kind of collaboration. The first TMN, 
the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), was founded in 
1990.298 Since then, many kinds of international relationships have developed and 
expanded. One of the most significant networks is the C40 Cities Climate Leadership 
Group (better known as C40), which was founded in 2005 and now includes over 80 local 
governments across the world.299 Boston and New York City were both early leaders to 
several city networks, such as ICLEI, C40, the Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance (founded 
2015), 100 Resilient Cities (100RC; founded 2013), and Urban Sustainability Directors 
Network (USDN; founded 2009). These networks use different strategies and have 
different foci, but they often are willing to collaborate. For instance, the UN, C40, ICLEI 
and United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) worked together to establish the UN 
Compact of Mayors in 2014.300 There are many networks beyond these examples, but this 
brief history suggests that the development of TMNs were tied to early responses to 
climate change and have since increased in number and size to become a robust set of 
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political organizations. As early members or “pioneer municipalities,” Boston and New 
York City have invested heavily in collaborative efforts and tend to fit into a group of 
“champion” network members that are highly active locally and transnationally.301 
Although many local governments are not as active as Boston and New York, their 
example demonstrates ways in which cities can gain access to the benefits of these 
international networks. 
The first TMNs date back to the 13th century in Europe, but the globalization of 
cities has led to a rapid increase in the number of networks and the breadth of the issues 
they confront.302 In particular, there are municipalities that can now be referred to “global 
cities” due to their influence, wealth and leadership that often is equal to or greater than 
many small countries. Lee writes, “Large global cities have significant economic, social 
and environmental governance,” and thus these local giants have become “forerunners in 
global climate governance.”303 Lee uses the new word “translocal” to describe the dual 
nature of cities that are both international and local, and similarly he describes climate 
change as a “glocal problem.”304 These new words combine traditional local aspects with 
international ones, reflecting the development of a more multilevel approach to climate 
change. Lee’s believes that TMNs are extremely significant to a city’s climate policy, and 
he even goes so far as to state that the “global cityness” of a municipality is the primary 
driver of how much a local government will be engaged in climate governance.305 While 
other scholars may not share this primary focus on TMNs, there is certainly support for 
finding a global role for local actors within a system of multilevel governance. 
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Superordinate Comparison – Regional Relationships 
 In contrast to the nation-to-nation focus and overall appearance of failure at the 
international level before the Paris COP21 in 2015, regional efforts on climate change 
tend to be focused on state-to-state relationships306 and have experienced greater success. 
American states are increasingly collaborating with one another as well as with provinces 
and states in Canada and Mexico, respectively. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) is one of the most widely publicized examples of this kind of network.307 RGGI 
started in 2005 with nine states from the Northeast region of the US, including 
Massachusetts and New York, in an effort to curb emissions and establish a cap-and-trade 
policy that began in early 2015.308 Other region-based collaborations established solely to 
confront climate change include the Western Regional Climate Action Initiative, which 
involves five western states and that was established in 2007, and the Southwest Climate 
Change Initiative, which involves two western states and that was established in 2006. 
Other initiatives were established at earlier periods and adopted new programs to address 
climate change in recent years. For instance, the New England Governors and Eastern 
Canadian Premiers, which includes six states and five provinces, was established in 1973 
but only agreed to work on regional climate change efforts in 2001.309 Similarly, the 
Western Governors’ Association includes 18 western states and only began addressing 
climate change in 2006. In contrast to this widespread state-based collaboration on 
climate change, regional networks between countries within a given region (e.g. between 
the US and Canada) have thus far not taken direct action on climate change. 
The level of successful climate action varies across these state-to-state networks, 
but overall these initiatives are too new or unexamined to analyze their contribution to the 
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global climate regime. The largest conclusion one can draw is that simply by their 
existence and continued efforts, they appear to be more actively confronting climate 
change than country-to-country efforts. Despite their success, overall the academic 
literature focusing on state-to-state relationships is fairly modest, only having been 
moderately covered in the news and in the work of certain scholars such as Barry Rabe. 
Once again, more informal relationships and partnerships are even less studied in 
academic research. 
Furthermore, new partnerships between the U.S., Mexico and Canada since 2016 
suggest that there is an opening in the literature for future study in country-to-country 
regional relationships and informal networks.310 These more informal collaborations are 
still too new to evaluate, but as they have previously relied on Obama’s political 
leadership, it seems unlikely that this strategy will continue during the Trump 
administration. 
Even with the relative success of these state-based and past country-based efforts 
to combat climate change, regional collaboration between local governments provides an 
additional set of advantages and strategies. In a system of multilevel governance, efforts 
different levels of government do not need to compete or replace one another. Instead, 
each level has its own role in the success of the overall climate regime. Thus both 
international and regional city efforts work in conjunction with comparative relationships 
at superordinate levels of government.  
Background of Regional City Relationships 
 In contrast to the relatively new use of TMNs and international relationships 
between cities to combat climate change, cities have long linked government efforts 
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across a region. As ancient as the city-state as a political structure, local governments 
have recognized the benefits of regional governance for millennia. A basic understanding 
of political logic demonstrates that banding together with one’s neighbors creates a 
stronger front against a larger problem.311 But in reality, some municipalities, such as 
New York City, have historically struggled with regional collaboration, making new 
efforts on climate change unlikely. This difficulty is mostly due to New York City’s 
unusual structure with three very strong state governments in a small region.312 This 
political fragmentation is compounded by the diversity of economic interests in the 
area.313 Kantor and his colleagues’ assessment supports this finding when he finds that 
regional collaboration on environmental issues is particularly difficult within New York 
City.314 Citing the local government’s inability to create tolls to enforce clean air 
standards, these researchers find that environmental policies have large effects on local 
economic development, creating conflict and rivalry between the parties involved.315 
Other cities and regions like New York City likely have similar past difficulties with 
collaboration and likely will continue to do so even as climate change becomes an 
increasingly pressing issue. 
 However, many new regional relationships have formed and older networks have 
adjusted to confront climate change with a fair amount of success. In contrast to Starr and 
Kantor’s findings of failure in NYC, recent climate change efforts in the region 
surrounding Boston have been very strong. This action has been centered in the 
Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC), which serves as a regional planning 
agency, and its example, as described by its Energy Planner and Manager of the Metro 
Boston Climate Preparedness Taskforce, Axum Teferra, helps to show the recent growth 
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and potential of city-to-city regional collaboration.316 One of thirteen units apportioned 
by the state, the MAPC is extremely large, including representatives from 22 cities and 
79 towns and covering 48% of the state’s population.317 The planning council claims that 
its efforts across many policy issues “resulted in almost 300 individual projects in 
regional and local planning, municipal collaboration, and public policy to advance the 
MetroFuture vision,” demonstrating the enormous influence of its network.318 Over 50 
years old, this agency demonstrates how an existing government network can effectively 
retrofit to confront climate change.319 The MAPC has helped to engage Boston and other 
cities in larger efforts on both mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to 
climate change since it put these issues on its agenda in 2015.320  
 More directly, the agency established the Metro-Boston Preparedness Task Force 
in 2015 to work on climate change impacts in the 14 cities and towns around Boston, 
made up of urban planners, city politicians and regional infrastructure agencies run by the 
state such as the Department of Transportation (DoT) and MassPort.321 The mayors of 
Boston and Somerville led the formation of the Task Force with the support of the 
MAPC, and now that it fully functioning, this “very collaborative process” is helping 
local governments to make more informed decisions and prioritize adaptation needs.322 
Although the recent origins of this Task Force mean that its impacts cannot be fully 
evaluated, the MAPC helps to demonstrate the recent growth and planning structure of 
regional planning agencies that work to combat climate change. 
 Boston and New York City represent the full range in variation in the 
effectiveness of regional collaborative efforts, but the overall lack of literature on this 
topic limits our ability to generalize based on these cases for now. Similarly, informal 
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regional work outside of established networks is even less studied, and so, as noted 
previously, the following analysis will rely mostly on the work that has been done in 
formal planning agencies like the MAPC. Without the attention or power of an 
international TMN or project, regional networks and relationships have not yet been 
carefully studied, and likely future work will have to build upon case studies across the 
US. Still, these two cities provide examples of how regional relationships between cities 
can be blocked by obstacles or can increase a city’s ability to combat climate change. 
While Boston’s example is not representative of all metropolitan regions in the US, the 
city serves to demonstrate the potential benefits from this kind of collaboration. As 
Kantor and his colleagues conclude, even New York City has a “surprising capacity to 
mount some coherent, if limited, regional governmental responses to the new forces of 
global changes,” and the municipality has successfully collaborated with its watershed on 
environmental degradation. 323  Thus, while analyzing the range of obstacles and 
opportunities that impact the growth of a regional city-to-city relationship on climate 
change is beyond the scope of this paper, sections 5.C and 5.D will showcase the range of 
potential benefits of these networks, as demonstrated in several key examples.  
5.C Benefits of Both International and Regional Relationships 
Overview  
 While most scholars find that membership in city-to-city collaboration provides 
distinct advantages, a few authors think these networks are at best unnecessary and 
unhelpful. For instance, Krause claims that the “influence of neighboring or peer cities” 
is one of the lowest motivating factors to take action on climate change.324 However, the 
vast majority of scholars describe the benefits of membership, several of which can be 
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found both in regional and international networks. Bulkeley claims that the establishment 
of organizations like ICLEI and Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) led to the first 
scholarly interest in city climate action.325 Furthermore, in some cities, a majority of 
climate action is directly related to involvement in a network; for example, 70% of 
Houston’s total actions are delivered through networks and collaboration.326 Similarly, 
Randolph supports this motivating aspect of city networks with his finding that ICLEI 
membership led Miami-Dade County and King County to act on adaptation policies.327 
The following sections examine the range of benefits in depth within international 
and regional networks and relationships. Both types of collaboration give cities four main 
advantages: shared knowledge with other cities, access to resources, a more flexible 
governance structure and, most importantly, new opportunities for vertical influence. 
This vertical influence is based on the amassed power of these networks in which cities 
are able to overcome the disadvantages of their smaller size and jurisdiction in order to 
play a larger role in the global climate regime.328 Overall, the vast growth in these intra-
city relationships helps to increase local governments’ knowledge, expertise and capacity 
to deal with the far-reaching issues associated with climate change.  
Sharing Information 
The first benefit of city-to-city collaboration is the one most agreed upon by 
scholars, networks and cities alike: sharing information. Scholarly research on this 
advantage, like any research on these city-to-city collaboration, has been mainly focused 
on international networks rather than regional or more informal counterparts. Kern and 
Bulkeley claim that “strategies of information and communication are the bread and 
butter of TMNs,” and the widespread agreement on this benefit demonstrates that this 
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spreading of knowledge is one of the most essential characteristics of networks, both for 
mitigation and adaptation efforts.329 For instance, reporter Erika Bolstad from Climate 
Wire described the advantage of joining a network like 100 Resilient Cities (100RC) 
where cities are working on many of the same challenges.330 Cities like New Orleans, 
Norfolk and New York City are facing the difficulty of planning for rising sea levels, and 
so a city would benefit from hearing about the innovative strategies used by others in the 
absence of top-down regulation from higher levels of government.331 Similarly, Elizabeth 
Hanson, the C40 City Advisor from New York City, explained that, “You know people 
all around the world are trying to solve this same problem. And so rather than reinventing 
the wheel it's helpful for… city staff members to be able to have points of contact around 
the world and… here in the region that are working on the same issues.”332 Hanson’s 
statement shows that the principle of sharing policy experience and ideas is also 
experienced at a regional level, and the MAPC in Boston finds that regional agencies are 
particularly adept at promoting best practices.333 Likewise, one of the main strategies of 
the Water Utility Climate Alliance (WUCA), which consists of ten of the nation’s largest 
water providers (including the NYC DEP), is to determine the best practice in climate 
adaptation and publicize the information.334  
One possible contribution to the vast success and use of this benefit of network 
membership is the popularity of writing reports in the city.335 There are many examples 
of strategies to gather this data within cities, and so it is an easy jump for their networks 
to utilize and distribute this information. Furthermore, formal networks can also help to 
set standards for measuring various climate-related properties. For example, the MAPC 
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helped Boston and Somerville governments to find and establish a task force on climate 
change with other municipalities who would face the same impacts.336   
There are many scholars who list this exchange of information as one of the key 
functions of city-to-city networks or collaborations, including Betsill and Bulkeley,337 
Van de Meene and Lee,338 Hakelberg,339 Corfee-Morlot,340 Shi,341 Giest and Howlett.342 
Van de Meene and Lee describe this exchange as “policy learning,” or a complex process 
with many actors that are working on a specific policy problem.343 They claim that policy 
learning on climate change is particularly beneficial because: “An important approach to 
dealing with increased uncertainty, such as that generated by climate change, is being 
able to respond to changing circumstances. Learning provides a central mechanism for 
improving adaptive capacity and facilitating policy adaptation.”344  This perspective 
demonstrates how the unique characteristics of climate change, specifically its 
uncertainty and widespread impacts, may be well suited to solutions from city networks.  
Hakelberg similarly describes this learning process as “governance by diffusion,” 
noting its ability to “accelerate processed by which chains of ‘interdependent but 
uncoordinated’ adoptions of certain policies lead to their broader dissemination.”345 Thus 
sharing information can unite traditionally separate and locally-focused cities into 
coordinated actors in multilevel governance. Likewise, Shi and her colleagues state that 
regional agencies can “foster local leadership by… communicating why and how some 
cities have translated their awareness of climate impacts into actual adaptation plans and 
projects,” using the MAPC as an example.346 In a third perspective, Kern and Bulkeley 
find that “Municipalities indicate that the opportunity to learn about ‘what works’ from 
other places is a key motivation for their participation in networks.”347 Thus, the desire to 
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gain access to this shared knowledge can also be an incentive to experience the other 
advantages of membership. Although the theoretical work done on the ways that cities 
share information focus on different advantages and processes, almost all authors seem to 
agree that networks and relationships help this process. 
Networks and their city members also frequently discuss the benefit of sharing 
information in this manner. In particular, the reports put out by the TMN C40 
demonstrate the organization’s strong focus on sharing strategies and information.348 
C40’s Megacities report claims that it serves to bring the “world’s megacities together in 
meaningful exchanges to speed up the global adoption of climate policies and programs 
that have been demonstrated to work.”349 The network explains that information sharing 
is one of the three largest benefits of membership, finding that “cities are learning from 
the successes of others and choosing to test best practices within their own 
jurisdiction.”350 This last statement once again emphasizes the multilevel governance that 
includes this horizontal action. By engaging in the collaborative horizontal dimension, 
cities are able to overcome disadvantages of limited jurisdiction or resources in the 
hierarchical dimension. C40 also evaluates this benefit more concretely when they find 
that there are “links between the extent of networking between cities and the scale of 
action delivered.”351 One possible explanation for this is that these larger actions are 
tested at one municipality within the network that then shares its results, thus allowing 
faster dissemination of best practices. 
City leaders seem to share this admiration of C40 and other networks. Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, the former Prime Minister of Norway, stated, “Knowledge is a valuable 
commodity in the green economy, and knowledge shared is knowledge amplified. The 
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C40 process recognizes this in order to avoid ‘reinventing the wheel’ and encourages 
people to find and highlight technology.”352 Mayor Naheed Nenshi of Calgary echoed 
these same ideas when he said,  
“Every city in the world has the same issues. We have to take out the trash, we 
need to make sure the road networks are in good shape, we need police and first 
responders… So… our key is how we share best practices, because we all have to 
deliver the same services at the end of the day, and we are all looking for better 
ways of delivering those services.”353 
 
These quotes help to demonstrate the “common sense” understanding of the value of 
sharing information about climate change strategies between cities. Even smaller 
networks seem to have this same affirmation from their members. Barber found that a 
survey by the CityNet association revealed that a “significant majority of cities agreed 
that city networks facilitated information exchange… and provided valuable input for 
policy making and capacity building.”354 By providing cities with such an abundance of 
information about best practices, TMNs are able to compensate for the silence and lack of 
guidance from certain state and national governments in many countries. This allows 
urban governments to take more independent action and ultimately make smarter policy 
decisions. 
Interviews with officials from the cities of Boston and New York City 
demonstrated the same understanding of this benefit, and often these officials almost 
mimicked other city leaders, scholars or networks’ reports on the issue. For instance, 
New York City’s Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) established a bilateral 
relationship with the city of Copenhagen in order to learn about the European city’s 
accomplishments in decentralized water management and community engagement.355 
Alan Cohn, Climate Program Director for DEP, said,  
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“They kind of are using storm water management and planning for these heavy 
rain events to actually guide urban planning moving forward. So any new 
development has to be built with water sensitivity and flood proofing in mind and 
it's not just about like raising things above the floodplain but actually building 
really cool landscapes that can absorb water… They're moving forward with it 
full force and it's really helping to improve public spaces there, not just making 
them resilient.”356 
 
Cohn’s statement demonstrates his detailed knowledge on the climate strategies of this 
distant city, showing the effectiveness of the information sharing process. Copenhagen’s 
innovative actions have impacts far beyond their own borders, showing how a network 
can amplify the effects of already successful actions. This collaboration was the DEP’s 
first international work, but the relationship inspired them to newly focus on integrating 
resiliency into all of their urban planning and to adapt their green infrastructure approach 
in a similar manner. 357  Even while NYC’s own officials praised the benefits of 
international collaboration, a study of 22 cities in C40 actually found that the city was 
one of the leading teachers of climate policy, finding that its practices were among the 
most studied and learned from in the world.358 This demonstrates how New York City 
has benefitted both from learning and from leading the world’s cities in climate action.  
This free policy learning aspect of international networks allows cities to find out 
about innovative new strategies addressing similar threats from climate change, allowing 
them to make better-informed choices for more successful climate mitigation and 
adaptation policy. Information exchange is the most agreed upon benefit of collaboration, 
and this factor alone likely persuades cities to engage in horizontal governance. 
Resources and Direct Assistance 
  A second benefit of collaborative relationships is the provision of assistance, 
which can come in many forms. First, a city can benefit from a network’s expertise in 
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several small ways.359 The TMN’s skills can be shared with local governments through 
“technical assistance and trainings, including workshops (and) funding to conduct 
emissions analyses.”360 A CityNet survey found that a significant majority of cities 
agreed that these networks facilitated technical support.361 Likewise, the MAPC was 
designated as the “technical assistance centers” for their member communities.362 
 In another form of direct assistance, a powerful international network, such as 
C40, can provide additional staff. As mentioned previously Elizabeth Hanson’s position 
is joint-funded by the organization and the NYC Office of Sustainability.363 Michele 
Betsill explains the value of this assistance by noting that cities are often unable or 
unwilling to fund an additional employee themselves, and so they benefit from the 
addition of personnel dedicated to climate issues “rather than adding it on to the existing 
portfolio of already overworked officials.”364 Adding an additional staff member for little 
or no cost is so valuable to cities that often they will participate in competitive 
application process to receive one.365 Reportedly each spot in the 100RC network, which 
provides funding to hire a chief resilience officer, has about ten cities competing for 
membership.366 This benefit can be even more valuable at the regional level where there 
are more small municipalities involved. For example, within the MAPC region, most 
small local governments do not have room for staff dedicated to work on energy, disaster 
preparedness or climate change, and thus the planning agency is essential for them to take 
action, a finding supported by Shi and her colleagues.367  
 Finally, formal networks can simply provide funding for climate projects, either 
directly from themselves or by helping to apply for larger sources of funding. As 
discussed in Section 4.B, the hierarchical lack of access to funding can often be a limiting 
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force in a city’s attempts to address climate change. While this limitation can push a city 
to take creative actions or frame an issue as an economic co-benefit, networks are able to 
help urban actors overcome their lack of funding by simply providing access to 
alternative sources, thus allowing these city-to-city networks to have a greater capacity to 
respond to climate change. For instance, members of 100RC can access $200 million in 
partner platform services.368 Taking this a step further, C40 is working to kick start a 
financing collaboration with the German federal government and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) to unlock $1 billion for sustainable infrastructure. 369 
Although this particular C40 project is limited to cities in low- and middle-income 
countries, it still demonstrates the innovative ways that these networks seek to assist with 
funding. Similarly, Shi and her colleagues find that regional planning agencies can “help 
overcome the lack of fiscal capacity and political support,”370 and the MAPC finds that 
regional cooperation can help municipalities take action on key policy areas “despite a 
more constrained financial world.”371 These examples help to show how networks in both 
theoretical and practical terms help their members to rely less on traditional sources of 
funding. By allowing access to this financial assistance, these networks are also providing 
an incentive for community stakeholders to collaborate with city efforts as they did with 
the Boston Living with Water Competition. It is clear that local governments are reaping 
the benefits of this assistance as C40 found that about half of actions delivered through 
networks utilized grants or subsidies.372 
Flexibility 
 While most of the other benefits described in this section function more directly 
to assist city policy making, collaborative relationships and networks also simply provide 
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better means to make policy through their flexible nature. Their resources are able to 
adapt to the unique needs of every member due to their local focus, allowing a more 
customized approach.373 Giest and Howlett argue that, “Networks are more flexible and 
less limited than, for example, rigid government programmatic restrictions to tackle 
place-based characteristics. They also have an increased reach to connect with 
knowledgeable actors, resources and multiple government entities.”374 Van de Meene and 
Lee echo this in their argument that this flexibility is important for dealing with increased 
uncertainty, an inherent feature in climate change policy.375 These authors find that 
learning and shared information actually provide a key way to exhibit this flexibility, thus 
intrinsically connecting these two benefits. This benefit of international networks 
certainly needs to be explored further, but thus far it is a fairly undeveloped area of 
literature. 
 The MAPC’s own reports demonstrate this flexible nature from a practical 
perspective. One report claimed that:  
“The agency feels nimble, agile and flexible. Staff members are excited to work at 
an agency that operates at the intersection of the public, private and non-profit 
sectors; that values pioneering thinking and allows staff to pursue innovative 
projects and funding opportunities; and that actively seeks to expand beyond the 
traditional areas of transportation, land use and environmental planning.”376 
 
This helps to demonstrate the more tangible ways that networks are able to achieve this 
abstract sense of flexibility and the ways in which its workings are preferred to other 
kinds of policy-making. While collaborations between cities face a unique set of 
obstacles, the smaller-scale of these governments allows them to find equivalent partners 
across the globe and to engage with them more meaningfully. Jessica Feldish, a Program 
Manager for Greenovate, described this sentiment in her claim that Boston is able to act 
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more creatively and “definitely form collaborations and relationships that allow us to be a 
little more nimble and respond faster and quicker,” and she was echoed almost word-for-
word by Elizabeth Hanson in NYC.377 Although these two officials were speaking more 
generally about their cities, this flexibility is a key distinction of city climate policy as 
opposed to superordinate levels of government. 
Vertical Influence 
 While city climate action may have first originated externally in these networks or 
in state action, cities are now using their membership in order to “raise the profile of 
cities in national and international climate debates and to put pressure on national 
governments, especially the US, to take more robust action.”378 This benefit is now one 
of the most important aspects of city-to-city collaboration, and it is found almost entirely 
in TMNs. However, regional networks and relationships work to increase their vertical 
influence through direct action. For instance, the MAPC in the metropolitan Boston area 
sits on several state and national boards related to climate change, and actively uses this 
position to gain the support of higher levels of government.379 The regional agency 
lobbied the state governor and state legislature to continue financial support from the 
Sustainable Communities grant by increasing technical assistance funds for regional 
climate action, demonstrating a more direct form of vertical influence from a network 
based on city relationships.380 Likewise, the personnel in the Water Utility Climate 
Alliance (WUCA) actively communicate with the national government in order to 
influence larger policies on sustainability and resiliency.381 
 International networks are also capable of similarly directly promoting their 
preferred policies, but there is far greater focus on, and support from, both academics and 
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local governments themselves for the ways that TMNs increase their members’ vertical 
influences more indirectly. At first glance, international collaborative efforts are more 
intentionally focused on amplifying city policies. Kern and Bulkeley include “influence” 
as a key action of TMNs,382 and similarly, Hakelberg notes that international networks 
give municipal action a voice at the national level.383 Notably, TMNs seem to feel that 
this benefit is one of their largest roles, but in general, studies and reports focus more on 
indirect vertical influence rather than intentional amplification. Through their larger size 
and international presence, TMNs in particular, as opposed to regional networks, provide 
an important sense of legitimacy to city climate action. While this legitimizing nature has 
other benefits (discussed below in Section 5.E), it plays an especially important role in 
increasing the international impact of city climate action. 
 The first step of this indirect vertical influence is to build an international 
reputation for city action, which can take place both indirectly and formally. For instance, 
C40 describes the benefits of its membership as helping to “increase (the cities’) visibility 
as leaders responding to climate change” and to provide “hard evidence that cities are 
true climate leaders, and that local action can have a significant global impact.”384 
In this way, international city networks can help build the reputation of local 
governments as global powers. TMNs can also provide a more formal international 
platform by allowing cities to take part in international climate negotiations between 
countries. Kern and Bulkeley describe this opportunity: “Within the international climate 
change regime, climate change networks have been granted observer status and hold side 
events to publicize the achievements of their members and the possibilities for taking 
action at the annual Conference of the Parties.”385 By showcasing city leadership both 
Florack 
108 
informally and formally, TMNs help local governments to build an international 
reputation for their success in climate policy, showing them as leaders in a crucial policy 
space where national governments have been relatively paralyzed with the exception of 
the Paris Climate Talks in 2015. 
Examples from primary and secondary documents that support this international 
aspect of networks abound. For instance, Barber finds that many local governments 
believe that their membership in city networks facilitated their international exposure, 386 
and similarly, C40 claims to “amplify individual city solutions by providing a global 
platform for showcasing city successes.”387  Corfee-Morlot and his colleagues claim that 
networks allow cities to become active in the global agenda for climate change,388 and 
similarly, Elizabeth Hanson from New York City found that the city’s participation at 
COP21 provided a platform from which cities could call for greater actions from their 
nations.389 The Compact of Mayors linked the importance of building a city’s reputation 
to international influence by stating that it served to increase the visibility of local leaders 
responding to climate change, “demonstrating their commitment to an ambitious global 
climate solution, particularly as nations convene around a new climate agreement in Paris 
in December 2015.”390 Although it is certainly possible that these networks could be 
biased in overestimating their influence at the international level, this wide range of 
support demonstrates that at the very least, TMNs work very intentionally to increase this 
vertical influence. 
 This heightened reputation and participation in international climate negotiations 
works to increase the overall influence of these cities. C40 puts these actions together 
through its key goals of city diplomacy: demonstrate how cities are leading the way, and 
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have a positive impact on an inter-governmental agreement to tackle climate change.391 
This second goal demonstrates a multilevel governance mentality as networks see a clear 
role for cities to be a part of international climate negotiations.  This vertical influence is 
possible due to the collective binding of city power through these networks. Rather than 
an individual city having a single small voice to its national government, TMNs allow 
municipal governments to combine their voices into a more powerful figure on the 
international level. 392  Again, C40 describes this benefit: by allowing cities to 
“demonstrate their collective impact… (the network) provides them with a platform to 
engage effectively with national government and international negotiations.”393 This 
statement shows how these reputation-building actions have a much larger impact than 
simply creating political legitimacy in one’s hometown. In addition, international 
networks allow urban leaders to work directly with senior officials of international 
organizations instead of being restricted to a state or national government that may be 
resistant to climate action. Overall, TMNs allow cities to build their individual 
reputations, which in turn creates a powerful network that has a place at the table of 
national and international climate negotiations. Through this opportunity to demonstrate 
their leadership as well as through more direct regional efforts, local governments are 
able to positively influence the larger climate regime, fulfilling a much-needed pressure 
in multilevel governance. 
5.D Benefits Specific to International or Regional Relationships 
 International and regional relationships work in conjunction with each other rather 
than in competition, and the horizontal dimension of multilevel governance will be most 
successful when collaboration occurs at both levels. Although these two types of 
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collaborative relationships share a large number of benefits (see Section 5.C), there are 
advantages specific to either regional or international networks that make them valuable 
and essential for climate action in their own right. For instance, Giest and Howlettt find 
that while international networks can provide huge resources and act as a source of 
legitimacy, their “champion-picking” nature does not motivate new cities to take action 
on climate change, creating a disadvantage that will be discussed more in Section 5.E.394 
Thus, these individual champion cities “have to be connected to less active cities 
regionally, to engage a wider network in their environment.”395 This shows that that these 
global, high-profile networks work in conjunction with regional relationships rather than 
replacing them.396 The two types of collaborative relationships are tied together by their 
individual advantages, just as different levels of government each provide their own 
unique benefits, thus deepening our understanding of multilevel governance. 
Benefits Specific to International Relationships and Networks 
TMNs and related international relationships provide two unique advantages: 
linking distant cities with common needs and increasing legitimacy. This first benefit 
improves the sharing and spread of information, while the latter helps to increase access 
to resources and local support. 
First, networks can benefit their local members by providing opportunities to meet 
and collaborate.397 Although a great deal of network action happens directly through its 
personnel, these networks can also take a more relaxed approach by simply allowing 
cities to connect through its events and communication systems. This collaboration can 
take place in several forms. For instance, C40 hosts a biennial Mayors’ Summit, 
physically bringing all these city leaders together.398 In annual network workshops, 
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participants “set out an agenda for how C40 can help those cities collaborate throughout 
the year.”399 Furthermore, the benefits of project twinning can be felt even outside of 
networks, such as the NYC and Copenhagen did with water management.400  
This linking ability also may help different cities to share information. While 
some urban areas may have totally different challenges and needs, formal networks help 
cities with similar issues to work together. For example, in NYC the buildings sector 
generates about 70% of carbon dioxide emissions while in Bangkok the majority of 
emissions come from transportation, making it difficult for the two cities to share relevant 
mitigation tactics with each other.401 However, TMNs and regional networks can help 
with this goal because they can match cities with similar issues or strategies, as C40 does 
by creating themed focus groups. 
In these ways, networks can act more as conveners of local actors with similar 
struggles rather than as active contributors. The survey of CityNet members emphasized 
that most members agreed that networks helped to move relationships with other cities 
‘beyond friendship,’ leading to better policies and better partnerships.402 These systems 
provide opportunities for cities to “collaborate on initiatives of mutual interest and 
benefit,”403 allowing them to “band together to use their collective power to access 
partnership resources.”404  
Second, by combining city voices and tying them to a well-known international 
organization, TMNs can provide their members with a greater sense of legitimacy.405 
While this is important for building vertical influence, this indirect benefit can also 
allows cities access to better funding. For instance, networks that gather information 
about the impacts of climate policy and standardize it can build their case for acquiring 
Florack 
112 
larger loans and grants. C40, ICLEI and WRI worked together to establish the Global 
Protocol for Community-scale GHG Emission Inventories (GPC) to measure a city’s 
emissions.406 This standardization, used by New York City,407 allows cities to measure 
emissions and track their progress, allowing them to share information as well as creating 
accountability and helping cities to make a stronger case to achieve more financing.408 
Similarly, the Compact of Mayors works to build a “consistent and robust body of data 
on the impact of city action.”409 By collecting this data, these networks supply strong 
cases for any city looking to increase its funding. 
 The legitimizing aspect of networks can also help to build local support for 
climate action. Elizabeth Hanson, the C40 City Advisor for NYC, described the value of 
the award at the Paris Climate Talks in 2015 that the city received for their energy 
efficiency efforts in buildings. She stated that it is “always helpful… when you’re dealing 
with stakeholders who may be… concerned about the pace of change… to be able to 
point to someone like C40 and say, you know they recognize that this is important work 
and they recognize that globally we’re a leader on this.”410 In this way, international 
acknowledgement of local efforts gives local stakeholders a sense of pride and 
accomplishment, making them more likely to support climate policies in the future. 
Benefits Specific to Regional Relationships and Networks 
 Most importantly, regional collaborative efforts provide a unique approach that is 
particularly helpful for adapting to climate change, and especially where there are cross 
regional effects and economies of scale in responding jointly. In any individual location, 
the level of greenhouse gas emissions is almost entirely distinct from the severity of the 
impacts in climate change, and thus an international response is vital. But even with this 
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universal nature, each kind of response and impact will be shared by a region, forming 
natural connections to take action. Sections 2.E and 2.F help to illustrate how a response 
to natural disasters is related to a local focus. The MAPC describes this problem when it 
explains its own structural advantage in addressing this critical issue:  
“After all, the impacts of climate change are not felt purely on the local level; 
rather, they transcend municipal boundaries, affecting several communities at a 
time as watersheds are taxed, sea levels rise, and disasters strike. MAPC can 
respond to climate change on this regional level, linking the work of individual 
municipalities and state agencies to create a seamless, regional approach.”411 
 
Even while acknowledging the unique benefits of regional action, the last part of this 
quote demonstrates recognition of the multilevel nature of their approach. Furthermore, 
this helps to illustrate how a regional response is often the most practical approach for 
policy areas most related to climate change adaptation, such as sea wall construction or 
emergency response.  
As discussed in Section 2.F, there is a great deal of support for the essentially 
regional nature of climate change action in academic literature as well as among city 
actors. Starr explains the long history of neighboring cities working together on shared 
infrastructure,412 and Stone looks to the future to call for the use of a regional scale in 
new policy frameworks and scientific assessments of climate change.413 Meanwhile, 
Kaufman as well as Corfee-Morlot and his colleagues focus on policy areas that are 
particularly characteristic of regional action. Kaufman describes the simultaneously 
critical and vulnerable nature of geographically large but interconnected networks like 
electric grids414 while Corfee-Morlot and his colleagues find that there is a need for 
regional action in New York City to decrease the vulnerability of water infrastructure to a 
rise in sea level. 415  Similarly, Sassen finds that city life depends on “massive 
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infrastructure and institutional support,” including electricity utilities, transportation, 
hospitals and many other forms of regional infrastructure.416 
A report by C40 agrees with these scholars, noting that appropriate action in 
relevant policy issues, such as energy, water supply, and transportation, must be planned 
beyond individual city borders.417 Likewise, Romero-Lankao and her colleagues claim 
that adaptation planning can be “greatly enhanced by incorporating regionally or locally 
specific vulnerability information.” 418  While multilevel governance is one way to 
regulate these larger policy areas, regional collaboration is a more specific tactic to do so. 
Jessica Feldish, a Program Manager for Community Engagement in Boston, noted that 
the almost inherently regional nature of topics like energy, regional preparedness and 
waste requires collaboration between local municipalities.419 Similarly, Mia Goldwasser, 
the Climate Preparedness Program Manager in the city of Boston, emphasized the 
intentionally regional approach to adaptation policy, claiming that Boston is particularly 
capable of regional collaboration and emphasized the value of a structure like MAPC. 420 
The regional collaboration in Boston is not only an advantage distinct to the city but also 
essential for tackling climate change impacts. For instance, Goldwasser highlighted a 
project addressing the flood pathway in Charlestown, which includes two towns and two 
state agencies.421 These examples demonstrate how both the theory and application of 
regional governance agree on its necessity for adapting to climate change. 
5.E Impacts and Limits of the Benefits of Horizontal Action 
Impacts of City-to-City Collaboration 
 These benefits of horizontal action work together to achieve three main impacts: 
increasing city jurisdiction, stimulating climate action at the city level and shaping 
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framing. As examined in Section 4.A, cities are generally limited in their jurisdiction over 
policy areas relevant to climate change. Barber believes that it is precisely this “absence 
of power” that compels cities to collaborate on common strategies, as they do in these 
networks.422 Krause is more surprised by city action on topics beyond their jurisdiction, 
and she suggests that cities know that their individual actions cannot reduce emissions 
enough to decrease the intensity of climate change nor can they adapt a large enough area 
to help with a population’s resilience.423 Krause marvels at the urban response to take on 
large upfront costs even with this insignificant position, but connections between local 
governments help to amplify the impacts individual actions to significantly contribute to 
global climate change efforts.  
By joining together in international networks, cities are able to become more 
powerful than they would be in a traditional hierarchical system, obtaining a reputation, 
legitimacy and influence at a much higher level. For instance, Betsill and Bulkeley find 
that TMNs are often given the authority to take on roles that traditionally belong to the 
state, such as setting GHG emissions targets.424 As described above, networks help cities 
to “influence national and international policy agendas and (drive) the market by 
leveraging the collective voice of cities.”425 This vertical influence demonstrates that 
local governments have gone far above their traditional role in decentralized government, 
taking a more central place in the system of multilevel governance. These city networks 
allow members to influence policy areas that they traditionally have no control over, 
effectively increasing their jurisdiction.  
In addition to this added power, networks and collaborative relationships 
stimulate action from urban governments, and there is a fair amount of support for the 
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practical effects of this conclusion. Unlike regional efforts, the development of 
international climate networks has been well documented both by organization websites 
as well as academics. Krause traces the origins of local action on climate change to the 
founding of ICLEI, the first TMN, in 1991.426 Several other authors agree that the 1990s 
were the origins of all city climate action427 as well as the first city networks focused on 
climate policy.428 This parallel timing suggests that networks played a role in inspiring or 
encouraging the first city climate action. Hakelberg agrees with this conclusion, finding 
that TMNs such as the Climate Alliance, CCP, Energy Cities and C40 were identified as 
“important drivers of local action on climate change” because they set reduction 
commitments.429 Bulkeley provides one explanation for the ways that TMNs prompt local 
action by claiming that these networks offer “soft” rewards through competitions and 
awards.430 Just as cities often use incentives to spur voluntary participation among the 
community, international networks are able to encourage action with local governments. 
Collaboration, either in a network or in a more informal relationship, can also 
help to stimulate action more indirectly. For instance, the advantage of networks to build 
vertical influence and local reputation also supports city climate action. First, this 
attractive benefit of network action is tied to a TMN’s ability to secure new resources for 
cities. As a city becomes more of a world power, this reputation will help it gain access to 
new funds and assistance. C40 sees these benefits as being so interconnected that 
“securing resources for C40 cities” is the third of its key goals for city diplomacy.431 An 
additional benefit of this reputation-based aspect of networks is that it can create 
significant peer pressure to promote compliance among laggards.432 By providing new 
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resources and creating peer pressure, these intra-city relationships are able to stimulate 
further climate action.  
Similarly, Bulkeley finds that, “Municipal networks are found to be successful in 
enrolling and keeping members so far as they can offer expertise, funding opportunities 
and the ability to disseminate and learn from good or best practices.”433 These networks 
attract new members and thus are able to engage cities in the larger range of benefits that 
assist climate action. A report by the MAPC notes that regional networks can function as 
an access point for local stakeholders, thus involving a whole new set of actors in city 
climate policy.434 By sharing information, local governments are able to learn about more 
effective and feasible actions. Likewise, the flexibility and legitimacy gained from 
membership allow municipalities to take more creative and innovative actions while 
maintaining local support for programs. Furthermore, cities with access to increased 
resources are able to further their actions in a way that is not possible in traditional 
isolation. Moreover, a city’s membership in a TMN can actually lead to more 
collaboration and action in the municipalities surrounding such a member.435 Hakelberg 
suggests that smaller cities do not have enough resources to achieve and maintain full 
membership in these larger networks, but they “rely on communication with nearby cities 
to access information on policy innovations.”436 While often these benefits remain more 
abstract, the logic behind the ability of networks to stimulate action is clear. 
Last, these regional and international collaborations influence the type of framing 
that a city climate policy is designed with, amplifying the trends found in Sections 2.E 
and 2.F. As described in Section 2.E, city actions generally tend to be local rather than 
international and based on co-benefits rather than climate leadership. It is a fairly logical 
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assumption that regional networks will promote action with local or regional benefits 
while international networks will encourage action as part of an international strategy on 
climate change. At the same time, international networks can lead to either an 
international frame for urban climate policy or to a combination of framing between 
international and local. For instance, Elizabeth Hanson, who is jointly employed by the 
TMN C40 and the city of New York, stated that all other city advisors in the same 
position are “required to split their time” between local projects like energy efficiency in 
buildings and helping the city to meet C40 goals across the country.437  Similarly, the 
international relationship between NYC and Copenhagen has actually led New York to 
try new policies to encourage community engagement.438 Furthermore, C40 recommends 
that cities articulate the economic and health co-benefits of climate actions to gain more 
support even while sponsoring conferences at the UN COP talks.439 With this flexibility, 
international and regional collaborations influence the way that municipalities frame their 
policies. While there is no clear rule that a particular network will cause a particular 
framing, these two kinds of relationships allow urban governments to shape their 
strategies as either local or international with ease. This makes an internationally-focused 
policy possible in a way that is relatively rare in most other forms of city climate action. 
Limits to Benefits 
 There are many scholars who doubt the advantages of membership in a 
collaborative relationship or network. This criticism generally takes form in three main 
ways. First, some authors directly question specific benefits listed above, and just as 
sharing information and increasing vertical influence have the largest amount of literature 
support, these two advantages also have the greatest number of criticisms. For instance, 
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Kern and Bulkeley note that the benefits of sharing information are limited because often 
times examples of best practices are simply submitted without any standardization or 
critique, making it difficult to learn critically from others’ practices. 440  Similarly, 
Hoornweg and others note that different measurement systems to account for carbon 
dioxide emissions can lead to difficulty in transferring information between countries.441 
Still, these complaints are relatively modest as obstacles to achieving the benefits claims 
by a majority of scholars.  
Furthermore, Bulkeley and Rabe’s criticism centers on a key benefit, doubting the 
ability of these networks to have vertical influence: “We note that national and 
transnational networks have been central in mobilizing local officials on the climate 
issue, but that such networks have been less significant in the development of state 
climate policies.”442 This comment seems to confirm the suggestion above that networks 
may overestimate their ability to influence higher levels of government. However, given 
that there does not seem to be much literature that strongly evaluates the vertical impacts 
of city networks, it is more likely there simply has not been a focused academic effort to 
evaluate this benefit. Corfee-Morlot and others sum up this lack of academic focus by 
simply concluding that the political benefits of membership are unclear.443  
In a second form of criticism, scholars question the overall impacts of city-to-city 
collaboration: the ability to increase jurisdiction and to stimulate action. There is of 
course a necessary limit to the level of authority that cities are capable of achieving due 
to their structural confines within the American federalist system, as described in Section 
4.A.444 Giest and Howlett find that while “TMNs are the institutional foundation for a 
concerted effort in climate change within and between countries, they are also subject to 
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the provisions from national and regional governments, which might hamper their 
benefits.”445 Thus while scholars do not tend to refute the basic principle that cities 
increase their jurisdiction and authority through collaborative efforts, they argue that such 
an increase has a necessary limit due to the government structures that these cities and 
their networks are embedded in. While city-to-city networks and partnerships are not able 
to require any sort of action, the voluntary nature of membership suggests that local 
governments are already willing to take on climate actions beyond what is required. At 
the very least, it seems only logical that membership could only lead to increased rather 
than decreased action. 
Furthermore, academics that question the ability of these networks to stimulate 
action focus on their lack of hard power. For instance, Kern and Bulkeley find that 
activities to build reputation like recognition and benchmarking are rarely used in formal 
networks, likely because they lack the authority to require members to achieve specific 
performance levels.446 This questions the fundamental power of networks to hold any 
authority over their members. More concretely, some scholars suggest that membership 
may often be more symbolic than contributing to real climate action.447 Giest and Howlett 
describe this purely symbolic climate action as paying “lip service” for programs that are 
never translated into action.448 Even if participation in these international collaborative 
efforts is purely symbolic, it continues to raise a green reputation and culture within the 
city, which will produce higher citizen expectations for such action.  
Third, by far the most widespread criticism of networks refers to the uneven 
distribution of benefits of membership.449 Kern and Bulkeley describe this problem: 
“Although the more interventionist approaches such as benchmarking and 
certification create peer pressure which appears to be a powerful tool in 
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promoting compliance, particularly among laggards, all three networks have only 
used such approaches to a limited extent… Certification is still confined to the 
most active cities which have already launched many local initiatives in the area 
of climate change policy and want to demonstrate their progress.”450 
 
This statement demonstrates how TMNs in particular can function as “networks of 
pioneers for pioneers,” resulting in the uneven distribution of benefits primarily to 
member cities that were already extremely successful on climate action.451 Climate 
actions both outside and within networks are resource-intensive, thus attracting the most 
active and established climate actors.452 In contrast, passive members that lack the 
resources to take action themselves may be continually beaten out for these benefits,453 
and thus their passive membership may become simply symbolic.454 Betsill and Bulkeley 
describe this focus on previously established leaders as “champion-picking,” ultimately 
crediting networks for their members’ individual successes and failing to motivate further 
climate action.455 Still, even if benefits are available only to a few cities that are already 
well-established, the resources and ability to increase vertical influence will still continue 
to benefit climate action in those regions. 
Overall, the benefits of membership in collaborative relationships have not been 
sufficiently examined within academic literature to evaluate their strengths and 
limitations. My review of the current criticisms suggests that scholars tend to emphasize 
the limits of certain benefits rather than refuting them entirely. While scholars may have 
their doubts, in some ways city participation effectively speaks for itself, demonstrating 
that local governments find the benefits offered by TMNs and other networks are worth 
the effort it takes to join them.  
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5.F Conclusion  
The benefits of working in city-to-city relationships and networks are apparent. 
International collaborations between local governments seem to succeed over their 
counterparts between national governments while regional efforts provide the necessary 
partnership to address adaptation in particular. Formal networks specifically benefit cities 
seeking to act on climate change by encouraging and helping them to take larger actions, 
make informed decisions, benefit from global innovation, become leaders for world 
efforts and increase their influence in the global climate regime. Different authors 
describe this benefit in different ways. As a C40 report puts it: “The result is that cities’ 
actions to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and climate risks are bolder, and 
implemented faster, than if they were to go it alone.”456 Bulkeley describes a network as 
providing the “resources and political space within which policy entrepreneurs can 
operate with some degree of protection from ‘politics as usual.’”457 Likewise Corfee-
Morlot and his colleagues simply find that networks allow cities to “link policies and 
programs that would otherwise operate in isolation… Regional strategies have the 
potential to make larger changes.”458 This principle of increasing one’s positive impact 
on the overall climate regime holds true across the various types of networks and 
collaborative relationships. 
Several authors believe that these relationships between local governments are so 
successful that they should become the basis of international efforts on climate change. 
For instance, Sassen describe the need for a “global regime centered in cities,” seeing 
local governments as the “de facto components of the global environmental governance 
regime.”459 Indeed, Sassen claims that this system would promote the development of 
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new urban capacities regardless of sovereign country.460 Barber takes a more idealistic 
view in his call for a “global parliament” based on organizations like C40 and ICLEI to 
address climate change.461 In contrast to the never-ending struggle to maintain one’s 
sovereignty between nation-states, Barber believes that cities are able to work toward an 
“egalitarian interdependence” that relies on soft governance, effectively creating bottom-
up democracy.462 Most hopefully, Barber looks to Mayor Bloomberg of NYC, seeing his 
past international networking as the beginnings of the international infrastructure that can 
promote a much-needed, promising and ever-expanding level of change.463  
In this way, this idealistic vision views an international network of municipalities 
as the ultimate form of decentralized leaderhsip. While a world where international 
governance is performed solely through city networks is very unlikely, the concept of 
establishing a global civil society beyond traditional country borders echoes the theory of 
multilevel governance. The combination of TMNs and regional networks allow cities to 
approach climate change from both a local and international level, giving them the 
international power to take on such a large issue even while adapting policies to their 
unique issues and needs. Hakelberg puts this view most succinctly when he describes 
these global networks as an “increasingly fragmented, polycentric and transnational 
climate governance system that scholars see as the result of – but also the alternative to – 
obstructed international negotiations on a global climate agreement.”464 
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Section 6: Vertical Dimension of Multilevel Governance  
6.A Introduction and Background 
Just as a state or national government may influence the city through a 
hierarchical dimension relationship, a municipality may have an influence on the levels 
above it. This bottom-up approach to climate action, partially described in Section 5.C, 
recognizes local governments as policy makers, not just implementers for higher levels of 
government.465 To put this most directly, cities both affect and are affected by climate 
action at the international level. Kern and Mol put this in other words when they claim: 
“It can be assumed that both global climate change and global climate governance alter 
local practices and politics and vice versa.”466 This “vice versa” indicates a reciprocal 
relationship between the city and state that is rarely acknowledged in traditional studies 
about decentralized governments. While Section 4 discussed the hierarchical dimension 
of the city-state relationship, this section assesses the reverse – the vertical influence of 
cities on their states, a topic already discussed as a benefit of city-to-city networks. 
Most research in this area has focused on the positive effects a city can have in 
influencing climate policy at the state level, ignoring the option for a city to have 
negative impacts on state climate policy. However, given that the city has no authority 
over state’s actions, it could not limit this higher level of government in same the way the 
state can do to the city (as described in Section 4). Thus a city government that desires to 
resist climate change policy would likely only be able to practice this through their own 
inaction rather than directly trying to persuade higher levels of government to follow suit. 
Acknowledging this allows us to focus on the ways that city leadership has been used to 
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promote climate action at higher levels of government when studying the vertical 
dimension of multilevel governance.  
The city can promote state climate action in both adaptation and mitigation in two 
key ways: innovation and direct political pressure. With these two main pathways, this 
vertical aspect of the city-state relationship is much simpler than the simultaneous 
limiting and encouraging impacts of the state’s hierarchical influence. This is because the 
vertical dimension of multilevel governance goes beyond the traditional American system 
of decentralized government, and thus this new political sphere is still developing. Direct 
political pressure from the cities appears to be a relatively new phenomenon, and even 
while innovation has its roots in federalism, its use is expanded a great deal in climate 
policy. Thus, while cities are still experimenting with different ways of increasing their 
spheres of influence, these urban actors are helping to build more effective climate policy 
at all levels of government. 
6.B Innovation and Leadership 
 Cities can indirectly promote climate action at higher levels of government by 
leading by example and experimenting with new kinds of policy responses. Boston and 
New York City are recognized as clear climate leaders, taking more advanced actions 
than most states and certainly the national government. The MAPC regional planning 
agency in Boston “actively pursues opportunities for staying ahead of the curve and 
integrating innovative strategies that improve the quality of local and regional 
planning.”467 As mentioned in Section 5.C, international and regional networks can play a 
large role in building a city’s international reputation and combining the powers of 
various cities to increase their influence. At times, this leadership can subtly prompt 
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action at higher levels in a fight for political legitimacy. For instance, Betsill and Rabe 
find that governments are willing to compete to be the “leader” on climate change in 
order to access the “significant political capital at stake.”468 Sections 2.E and 5.D explain 
how a city’s successful climate policy can gain it a reputation as an international leader, 
and thus the pressure to not be outdone by a lower level of government will likely help to 
increase action at the state and national level. 
While this implicit pressure from leading by example is important, city leadership 
in climate policy is more often realized in experimentation at the local level, which can 
become a testing ground for national policy.469 As explained by Alan Cohn from the 
Bureau of Environmental Planning and Analysis (BEPA) within the NYC Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP): “I think that especially on resiliency the state and the 
federal government kind of look to see what the cities are doing and then I think try to 
encourage that type of thing more broadly.”470 Anguelovski supports this finding with her 
own belief that cities are generally are able to innovate adaptation policy more than 
mitigation policy. She claims, “In contrast to mitigation planning and implementation, the 
absence of models to follow has led local governments pursuing adaptation to test new 
ideas.”471 Still, there are plenty of examples of innovation in both kinds of policy. For 
instance, the city of Houston piloted one of the first zero-energy homes in the US, and 
Portland developed an early market for LEED building contractors.472 In Metro Boston, 
Axum Teferra, an Energy Planner for the MAPC, described the region’s interest in 
utilizing clean microgrid technology to localize energy production and increase energy 
resilience. 473  The examples demonstrate some of the policies that cities have 
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experimented with, and their findings have surely influenced other levels of government 
to use the same strategies. 
There seems to be fairly widespread agreement between both scholars and city 
government actors that cities are well suited to this task. Sassen finds that “cities are sites 
where these challenges can be studied empirically and where policy design and 
implementation often is more feasible than at the national level.”474 Similarly, Corfee-
Morlot and his colleagues claim: “Urban scale action may be important in its own right 
and able to provide a means of social and technical innovation that is not possible at 
broader scale, ultimately providing a vehicle for learning and broader dissemination 
where successful innovations occur.”475 These quotes reference the relative level of ease 
with which a city can experiment with a new policy, both due to its smaller size as well 
as its less complicated political process. Elizabeth Hanson, the C40 City Advisor for 
NYC, echoed this agreement when she discussed how the city’s greater flexibility, high 
levels of stakeholder support and local knowledge made New York City “among the best 
equipped in the world to try and figure out these solutions and policies.”476 Furthermore, 
the importance of political leadership described in Section 2.B suggests that these actors 
will be more likely to take risks and innovate new strategies in order to establish a 
reputation for themselves as leaders. Anguelovski does eventually argue that while the 
structural limitations on local climate action foster “urban entrepreneurship,” new 
programs are still limited in the speed of their development and the sustained gains they 
can achieve.477 While there may be some merit to her claims, the lack of academic 
support for her opinion suggests that cities often are able to have some vertical influence 
through their innovation. 
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In some ways, this bottom-up leadership by the city actually fits within the 
traditional understanding of decentralized and hierarchical government even as a local 
government increases its independence and international position. Jorgensen describe the 
framework to view local units as “laboratories of experimentation is borrowed from 
literature on federalism.” 478  However, this level of innovation and its impact are 
unprecedented in past policy areas. Corfee-Morlot and his colleagues argue that this 
advantageous influence of city action is key for the larger system of multilevel 
governance.479 With the lack of action by the highest levels of government on this 
enormous and all-encompassing issue, low-level experimentation with new strategies is 
at its most frequent and most valuable. For example, when Rabe argues for a national 
carbon tax, he looks to state and regional attempts to find the most feasible option.480 In 
the grand scheme of political history, climate change is a new issue, and so its urgency 
demands experimentation and innovation at all levels. Looking specifically at cities as 
“policy laboratories” helps to demonstrate that a city provides essential contributions to 
the larger system of climate action rather than simply being a puppet of the state or solely 
influencing its local population.  
6.C Direct Political Pressure 
 While innovation expands an aspect of traditional decentralized government, 
cities trying to directly pressure higher levels of government to act on climate must find 
new ways to circumvent the limits of a federalist system. There is no formal way for this 
to occur in the hierarchical and decentralized American government, and yet many city 
leaders seem to feel that this direct political pressure and advocacy is a key role of city 
climate action. Axum Teferra, an Energy Planner for the Metropolitan Area Planning 
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Council (MAPC) for the region of Greater Boston, said that the job of the Metro Boston 
Climate Preparedness Taskforce is to advocate for climate policy at the state level 
increase coordination with state and federal agencies, so that resilience practices cross 
silos and reach broader geographic areas.481 This example also demonstrates the vertical 
influence of networks discussed in Section 5.C. Similarly, the mayors of two cities in 
Massachusetts (Medford and Pittsfield) wrote a public letter to endorse a state Senate bill 
to accelerate the rate of increase for Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), using their 
public office to influence other levels of government and proving Roger Starr’s finding 
that mayors are able, and often strive, to impact legislation.482 In this way, cities work to 
promote policies outside of their jurisdiction using their informal power. 
 A city’s commitment to climate change can also translate to state action through 
the representatives in the state legislative branches. In Massachusetts, 11% of the House 
of Representatives and 15% of the state Senate represent some of Boston’s population, 
and New York City has an even larger delegation in its state legislature.483 Elected 
officials from these regions will likely be politically similar to the mayors elected in the 
same regions, and in this way, a mayor that establishes a strong tradition of climate action 
in the city can create expectations for elected officials at other levels of government. 
 In addition, municipal governments often display their climate leadership at 
international conferences and organizations, even when they are traditionally excluded 
from membership. For instance, cities cannot vote in the United Nations, but the 
UNFCCC recognized subnational governments as the second largest delegation of 
attendees at their international conferences.484 Jorgensen and her colleagues conclude, 
“Subnational governments are no longer mere observers in international climate policies 
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but also influential actors.”485 This new leadership role is very intentional, as indicated by 
the deliberate coordination of several international city organizations in scheduling to 
plan their conferences based on the schedule and locations of UN conferences.486 
 Both Boston and New York City leaders emphasized the beneficial impact of their 
cities’ leadership at international conferences like the 21st Conference of the Parties 
(COP21).487 This United Nations conference included sessions for these subnational 
leaders and even presented awards to leading cities like Boston. Elizabeth Hanson, the 
C40 City Advisor for New York City, said that COP21 gave cities the opportunity to 
“partake in the climate negotiations and really drive home the point… that cities are 
leading the way on climate action, and that there needs to be… national and sub-national 
level commitments to help advance this work.”488 Similarly, when speaking about the 
motivations for city leaders to attend COP21, Jessica Feldish, a Program Manager for 
Community Engagement in Boston, echoed this positive peer pressure when she said that 
these cities hope to influence national leaders by saying, “We are leaders of US cities… 
We are coming together to represent those people and we’re looking for bold 
commitments from the US for climate change.”489 These statements help to illustrate the 
way that cities see themselves having a large role in influencing the global response to 
climate change. 
This vision of cities as a beacon to guide all levels of government to effective 
climate policy sits within the larger system of multilevel governance, recognizing that the 
city’s actions are just one part of a global climate regime. Hanson spoke to this holistic 
approach to climate policy when she said her colleagues from C40 at COP21 found that: 
“There was a recognition that cities really are having a substantive impact on this issue 
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and that the work that we're doing is… helping to stack up to those nationally determined 
commitments.”490 Similarly, she believes that city choices and policies are “helpful in 
driving that conversation” on national commitments to act on climate. 491  These 
statements show that even while cities are pushing for locally focused adaptation policies, 
they are intended to be part of the larger effort to respond to climate change and have a 
role to play in pushing for action at different levels.  
6.D Concluding Thoughts on the Vertical Dimension 
 As the large cities have increasing global power, the limits of American 
federalism are being pushed. The relationship between the city and superordinate levels 
of government has become increasingly reciprocal, allowing the local to influence efforts 
above. In addition, the complex and broad-reaching nature of climate change necessitates 
a truly multilevel response, forcing the traditional hierarchical relationship to expand and 
rely more on the city’s leadership. Ohlhorst finds that “accelerated innovation occurs 
through multi-level reinforcement,” demonstrating that even while the system of local 
policy laboratories has been part of long-running forms of decentralized government, this 
vertical dimension of the city-state relationship also constitutes a key aspect of multilevel 
governance.492 This effort to have influence beyond a local area also may bring a city to 
take part in another aspect of multilevel governance by joining networks in order to 
expand their power, as discussed in Section 5.493 
Beyond a more equal relationship in multilevel governance, this effort to impact 
action at higher levels is a way to address the areas of governance that the city does not 
traditionally have jurisdiction over. As Mia Goldwasser, Climate Program Preparedness 
Manager for Boston noted, the city “can advocate to the state and it can join with other 
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cities in advocating to the state, but it doesn’t ultimately have that power” to have total 
control over issues within the state’s jurisdiction.494 But while local governments do not 
have jurisdiction over key aspects of climate change policy, it is clear that their effort has 
an impact on the levels of government that do. In this way, cities are able to circumvent 
their traditional limits within a federalist system and take part in a multilevel response to 
climate change. 
Despite the strength of the city described above, a city’s relationship with higher 
levels of government can diminish or increase the impacts of their effort. Urban 
governments that have collaborated with their states, as described in Section 4, may find 
it easier to get state actors to listen to their ideas. In contrast, government bodies that lack 
a “shared goal, vision or priorities” face a serious obstacle to a productive vertical 
relationship.495 This certainly seems to be true in the United States, where the strong 
subnational action still has not led to any large national attempt to take on the issue. 
However, even in a country as relatively inactive in national climate policies as the 
United States, which took its first real actions in 2009, the public rhetoric and actions of 
mayors to advance climate change adaptation and mitigation are visible to their local 
residents, helping to shape people’s beliefs and creating a culture of environmental 
activism that may hopefully have an influence on the highest levels of American 
government.    
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Section 7: Conclusion 
7.A Summary of Main Points 
This paper aimed to demonstrate the ways in which city climate policy may be 
different or similar to state and national efforts in the US, and it is my hope that it has 
helped to show the unique role of local responses to climate change. Throughout the 
examination of basic city actions, theories like multilevel governance and 
decentralization, hierarchical power relations, horizontal networks and vertical influence, 
there were many important conclusions.  
Section 2 provided a summary of some of the most distinctive features of city 
climate policy, basing these findings in real-world examples. This section showed the 
importance of vulnerability and political leadership to motivate local action, a finding 
supported by many scholars and that word-for-word proved one hypothesis of this study. 
Section 2 also found significant support for the value of community actors, both as 
stimulants and participants, in city climate policy. This finding supports the hypothesis 
that urban governments would have unique advantages. This conclusion is based almost 
entirely on real-life examples rather than academic studies, and thus it contributes a 
relatively new conclusion in the scholarly literature in this area. Last, this section outlines 
a framework for city climate policy for the rest of the paper, finding that actions tend to 
be framed locally and as co-benefits rather than simply for international climate 
leadership. It also found that local governments have a higher focus on policies that adapt 
to the impacts of climate change and that use community engagement to act. These two 
findings support the hypothesis that city actions will generally use small-scale strategies 
with local benefits, but they partially refute the hypothesis that cities will engage with 
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issues outside their own borders. Furthermore, this local focus within adaptation allows 
the urban response to climate change to be more unique and thus more valuable in 
matters of resiliency. Overall, this section lays the parameters of basic city action, and 
many of these general findings are examined more deeply throughout the rest of the 
paper. 
Section 3 provided an introduction to the theoretical framework of multilevel 
governance, summarizing the findings of many scholars and academic studies. First, the 
decentralized character of American government also reveals a long history of relatively 
independent local governments, a feature well studied in political science literature. This 
history partially refutes my hypothesis that federalism will inherently limit urban action. 
While there is an element of hierarchical relationships in traditional American federalism, 
the second element of decentralized action has only increased in importance as central 
government in the US has failed to produce effective climate change policy. Multilevel 
governance shows the escalation of this local action, explaining the remaining influences 
of hierarchical power while changing and expanding decentralized action into horizontal 
and vertical dimensions. This theoretical framework helps to place city climate action in a 
larger context as one aspect of a larger policy-making system. This theory is a more 
recent topic in academic studies, but it too is strongly supported by a majority of scholars. 
Multilevel governance demonstrates that the different levels of government are closer and 
more connected than common understandings would believe, and in doing so, this theory 
places city action into a larger and more interdependent system of climate policy. With 
this lens, Section 3 finds that the US has been more successful on climate action than 
commonly acknowledged. 
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In this way, Section 2 provided real-world and tangible examples to introduce city 
climate policy and Section 3 introduced the theories behind many of these actions. 
Together, these two sections lay out the framework for a deeper analysis of city action 
within the lens of multilevel governance and decentralized federalism.  
 Examining the hierarchical dimension of multilevel governance, Section 4 
describes the limits in jurisdiction and funding that define American cities, supporting an 
uncontested and well-proven conclusion of most academic literature on the topic. This 
finding also affirms the hypothesis that urban governments face unique disadvantages. 
However, this section of the paper also finds that despite these inherent limitations, real 
examples from cities demonstrate a variety of strategies to either circumvent these 
barriers or to find nontraditional paths. I find that a variety of actions described in Section 
2 serve this function, including local focus, co-benefit framing and community 
engagement. Section 4 also describes new actions, such as creative policy-making, 
persuasion and soft governance. In addition, this section of the paper also approaches this 
relationship between levels of government from the opposite side and examines the ways 
that states can encourage city climate action, thus contributing a previously unexamined 
aspect of the relationship between cities and superordinate levels of government. Again, 
these findings were based in real-world examples and are certainly limited by any given 
state’s stance on environmental issues, but this conclusion helps to outline a direction for 
further study of direct mandates, state incentives and resources, and true collaboration 
between different levels of government. Overall, the hierarchical dimension supports the 
hypothesis that federalism limits local governments, but past decentralized action and 
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current state encouragement of climate action demonstrate that this limiting effect is not 
an inherent characteristic of this structure of government. 
 Section 5 contributed a substantial portion of the paper, examining the 
development and benefits of international and regional city-to-city relationships. This 
area is one of the most unique and robust aspects of the local response to climate change 
and is similarly well studied in academic literature. Echoing the city’s autonomy in 
decentralized and multilevel governance systems, networks rely on voluntary action and 
maintain local independence through self-government. Participation in one of these cross-
city collaborative efforts provides many benefits for local climate policy, including 
shared knowledge, access to resources, flexible governance structure, an external effort to 
link similar cities, and new opportunities for vertical influence. Furthermore, the two 
geographical ranges of networks described help to show another aspect of the complex 
and interdependent nature of multilevel governance. Just as regional relationships 
respond to the truly regional impacts of climate change, international networks and 
relationships provide legitimacy and link distant cities with similar issues. Participation in 
these city-to-city collaborations, both formal and informal, help to overcome the limits of 
city jurisdiction, stimulate action and shape framing. This policy area is relatively new to 
academic study, and thus it is difficult to generalize these conclusions, but most 
importantly, these horizontal relationships allow local governments to take their largest 
steps onto the international stage, providing a new avenue for policy outside of the local 
focus described in Section 2 and supporting the hypothesis that cities will act on issues 
beyond their own borders. 
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 Section 6 expands on this increase of a city’s vertical influence, finding that 
municipalities can further impact higher levels of government indirectly through 
innovation as well as direct pressure. This international leadership supports the 
hypothesis that cities will act beyond their own borders. A clear agreement among 
scholars shows that cities have irreplaceable advantages to innovating and experimenting 
with new policy. Superordinate levels of government can then adopt these more efficient 
policies, and thus municipalities can contribute substantially to the development of policy 
at the state, national or international level. Similarly, their leadership can indirectly 
pressure a state or nation to follow suit by changing the culture and expectation of the 
community to demand action on climate change. Local governments can also directly 
pressure higher levels of government, clarifying the city’s role in multilevel governance. 
Section 6 demonstrates how cities both find ways to overcome their structural limitations 
and contribute unique actions to the global climate regime. 
 Between these conclusions, a few main points stand out across the entire paper. 
First, the limits of jurisdiction and funding described under the hierarchical dimension of 
multilevel governance define a great deal of city action, demonstrating the unique 
disadvantages of responding to climate change from a local level. From community 
engagement to international networks, almost every strategy described in this paper 
functions to either overcome these limitations on city power or to find new policy 
pathways. While any individual strategy may be shaped by a larger array of motivations 
and barriers, it is clear that jurisdiction and funding act as primary drivers of local climate 
action.  
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 Second, this paper has discussed the importance and value of local factors in 
determining a city’s response to climate change. Whether it be an area’s vulnerability to 
rising sea levels or the emphasis on community participation in strategies, local actors 
and consequences shape much of a municipality’s response to this global issue. However, 
this local focus does not simply isolate city climate action to its own borders, thus 
supporting two of my hypotheses that urban governments will use locally focused 
strategies and will act on larger issues. Instead, cities are filling a gap in earlier climate 
policy by accessing nontraditional resources and communities in order to combat climate 
change from the bottom-up. Thus, the city’s contribution to the global climate regime 
goes far beyond its simple participation in international networks or pledges to reduce 
emissions.   
 Third, the US approach to climate change shows that the political structure has 
changed to expand the role of local action through multilevel governance. Overall, this 
means that cities have a distinctive and equally valuable role in the “big picture” response 
to climate change, supporting the hypothesis that these urban governments have unique 
advantages. Betsill and Rabe claim that this “clear shift” from the traditional hierarchical 
approach of American government led to a more “decentralized epoch… where the state 
and local levels constitute the primary loci of governance.”496 Similarly, Engel defines 
the modern American political structure as “bottom-up federalism.”497 These statements 
show that these authors believe that the fundamental structure of American governance 
has changed, but my research found that remnants of the hierarchical dimension of power 
relations still exist within multilevel governance. Still, the climate responses of different 
local governments demonstrate some of the ways that these cities have increased their 
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influence and autonomy while still taking part in a system “characterized by 
interdependency among governments at different levels, shared competencies, and joint 
decision-making.”498 Within multilevel governance, city policies are an essential part of 
the larger climate regime, especially in the US where the national level has been mostly 
silent on this issue.499 In doing so, these local governments add a new meaning to the 
term “global city.” This political structure both increases city action and allows the 
surprising finding that the American climate response is more successful than commonly 
believed.  
7.B Broader Implications 
 The main points and conclusions described above also lead to some broad 
implications for city climate action both around the world and into the future. The 
conclusions of this paper are limited by its scope, basing examples on Boston and New 
York City and focusing on American cities. First, these two cities represent a far end of 
the spectrum of climate responses with their extremely progressive policies and strong 
state support. As noted in Table 1 in Section 4.A, the level of past environmental 
response in different states suggests that there will be a wide range of support and 
limitations on city climate policy. Furthermore, Boston and New York City also are 
liberal cities with a strong reputation for environmental action. Their community culture 
provides support for climate action likely far above the national average, making it easier 
to create and implement policy. In this way, Boston and New York City are certainly 
leaders with their own exceptional advantages. However, every single municipality in the 
world has their own extremely unique set of characteristics, and thus it is almost 
impossible to generalize based on a single city’s experience. Instead, the examples of 
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Boston and New York City provide examples of the potential benefit of certain 
characteristics. For instance, while these two cities have exceptionally active 
communities, their policies demonstrate the potential power of tapping these human 
resources and thus they can provide a model for further action. Still, the examples in this 
paper demonstrate one end of a spectrum, and each conclusion found above must be 
taken with full consideration to local factors. In addition the results of this study are 
limited by their focus on American cities. These local governments are generally much 
wealthier than those in developing countries, and their place in a developed country 
allows them to have a higher proportion of resources dedicated to climate efforts rather 
than more basic services. The examples in this paper also will differ from other global 
cities in developed countries due to the distinctive impact of American federalism as a 
national system of government. At the same time, some of the strategies and advantages 
described in this study could apply to cities around the world due to their inherent and 
general nature. For instance, city vulnerability to climate change is increasing in many 
locations, community actors can provide support in almost all cities, and TMNs already 
break country borders. Furthermore, many of the conclusions of this paper are supported 
by a great deal of literature from around the world, allowing for an extension of their 
broader implications. Thus, despite these limitations, the conclusions of this paper still 
allow for more informed speculations on how these same principles might be applied in 
other places and times.  
 First, climate change poses a unique set of political problems as compared to 
policy areas, and thus new and innovative actions will have to be taken no matter where it 
is addressed. For instance, Rabe finds that while other policy areas like health care and 
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education are as decentralized as climate change, climate change is particularly “heavy 
on imposing front-loaded costs and uncertain at best on conferring long-term benefits.”500 
Furthermore, climate change has broad-sweeping causes and consequences, and Gupta 
describes it as a “glocal” problem that operates simultaneously at several levels.501 This 
means that effective policy must inherently include the coordination of many actors. In 
addition, the impacts of climate change are akin to natural disasters, but while any 
individual hurricane or flood would be characterized by immediate and strong centralized 
action, the longer-time scale and more dubious occurrence of climate change means that 
this same centralized response is no longer possible. Last, the validity of this issue faces 
some extreme political opposition both within the US and around the world, and its 
impacts occur over a longer timescale than most politicians ever consider. These features 
come together to create a set of difficult problems that every response to climate change 
will have to cope with and adjust for. City climate policy around the globe will have to 
address this mismatch in scale and difficulty in framing. Boston and New York City 
provided key examples for adjusting to these factors, but it is certain that any future 
response will require similar levels of innovation and new decision-making processes. 
 Second, political structures will likely have to adjust in order to address these 
unique characteristics of climate policy. For instance, when reviewing the available 
literature on climate change governance, Gupta writes, “One of the key discourses in the 
literature discusses the most appropriate level for taking action.”502 An obvious solution 
to this mismatch in scale is the use of multilevel governance, a political structure that has 
already been studied across the world. This political reconfiguration can also take shape 
in different structures beyond multilevel governance, but very likely it will include an 
Florack 
144 
increase in the role of the city and subnational action. Bulkeley takes a strong stance on 
this issue and declares that multilevel governance is on the rise as the power of the 
nation-state falls.503 Similarly, Barber claims that nation-states are now irrelevant in 
globalized issues, and instead places his trust in a vision of a global urban parliament of 
city mayors.504 While Barber’s vision goes beyond the findings of this study, his belief 
that cities are an increasingly important and independent aspect of global politics can be 
applied to local governments across the world and through time.  
 A third and fourth broader application of the conclusions in this paper describe 
two key strategies for future action. First, local factors and community engagement are 
extremely influential and advantageous in determining a city’s response to climate 
change. Second, participation in networks and city-to-city relationships will provide 
many of the benefits described in Section 5 regardless of time or place. Local 
vulnerabilities and leaders will continue to motivate climate policy, and the influence of 
other local factors will be seen in the local framing and community-based strategies taken 
in each municipality’s climate policy. It is also likely that cities will continue to have a 
greater emphasis than other levels of government on adaptation policy, especially in 
developing countries that are most vulnerable. Furthermore, the success of city-to-city 
collaborations and networks has already spread across the world, demonstrating their 
broad application to many different areas. These networks can act as new and more 
flexible structures of governance, and likely will have a large role in the future global 
climate regime.  
 Last, the findings of this paper show that city governments have the potential to 
be active and dynamic, able to evade their limitations and forge new policy pathways. 
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This potential leadership points to a further responsibility to take action on climate 
change. The framework of multilevel governance requires action on all levels, and the 
individual abilities and advantages of local government show that their actions fulfill a 
vital need in the global response to climate change. Betsill summarizes this broad-
sweeping action, claiming that: “all levels of government and society must be actively 
involved in efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions.”505 Elizabeth Hanson, the C40 
City Advisor for NYC, emphasized the role of local government in particular to this task 
and noted that the participants in COP21 generally shared the “recognition that cities 
really are having a substantive impact on this issue and that the work that we’re doing is 
sort of helping to stack up to those nationally determined commitments.”506 Similarly, 
Corrie summarizes the irreplaceable role of cities when she concludes: “There is 
significant untapped potential in these local governments both to fill gaps in existing 
regulatory schemes and to define and structure regulations that operate concurrently with 
state and federal law while more precisely catering to unique local needs and 
concerns.”507 
Still, actions by superordinate levels of government are essential for changing 
energy sources, building new infrastructure and other tasks requiring higher levels of 
jurisdiction and funding. Statements by Boston and New York City public officials help 
to demonstrate this more abstract collaboration to combat climate change. Mia 
Goldwasser, the Climate Preparedness Program Manager for Boston, acknowledged this 
need for a multi-pronged approach when she said, “The city won’t be able to do it 
alone… because of its jurisdiction,” citing the need for action from state and national 
agencies as well as private community actors.508 Similarly, regional and city officials 
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including Axum Teferra and Elizabeth Hanson noted their personal opinions that action is 
required at all levels.509  
But at the same time, Goldwasser acknowledged the city’s responsibility to lead 
this collaborative and broad-sweeping effort. She said, “The city definitely has to be the 
leader on this… the city has to be at the forefront of saying that this is the direction that 
we’re going in because they have a lot of influence that way.”510 This statement 
acknowledges the dimension of vertical influence and views it as an essential aspect of 
the larger effort to combat climate change. John Brock, a Project Manager for Integrated 
Water Management in the NYC Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), 
assigned this duty to lead and innovate more specifically to large cities that are especially 
vulnerable to climate change.511 In a broader perspective, Alan Cohn, the Climate 
Program Director also from the NYC DEP, discussed his department’s innovative and 
cost-effective solutions and stated: 
“We have the local knowledge you know. So yeah I think it's difficult for the state 
to come up with those types of solutions because they don't, they aren't really 
embedded in it and they have the purview of enforcing the regulations at the state 
level. So I think it's kind of our… responsibility in a way to do so.”512 
 
Academics and studies also support this powerful view of city climate action. Bolstad 
finds that cities are able to “pick up some of the slack,” and a C40 report describes these 
local governments as “changemakers” and a “central part of the solution to climate 
change.”513 In this way, municipalities are both able to fill unique gaps in policy and are 
vital leaders in the global effort to combat climate change. It is clear that local 
governments are active and effective policy-makers, and their influence stretches far 
beyond the city limits, staunchly taking on the global issue of climate change.  
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Appendix 1: Table of Interviewed City Officials 
Name Title Department Date of 
Interview 
(mo/day/yr) 
Jessica Feldish Program 
Manager for 
Community 
Engagement 
Greenovate, a program of 
EEOS Cabinet within 
Communications and 
Community Engagement 
(CCE) – Boston  
6/29/16 
Carl Spector Commissioner 
of the 
Environment 
Department 
Environment, Energy, and 
Open Space Cabinet (EEOS) 
– Boston  
7/11/16 
Mia 
Goldwasser 
Climate 
Preparedness 
Program 
Manager 
EEOS – Boston  7/11/16 
Susan Cascino Director of 
Recycling 
EEOS – Boston  7/11/16 
Elizabeth 
Hanson 
C40 City 
Advisor for 
NYC 
Mayor’s Office of 
Sustainability – NYC  
7/15/16 
Axum Teferra Energy Planner Metropolitan Area Planning 
Council – Boston  
8/9/17 
John Brock Project 
Manager – 
Integrated 
Water 
Management 
Group 
Bureau of Environmental 
Planning and Analysis 
(BEPA) within the NYC 
Department of Environmental 
Protection (DEP) – NYC  
10/12/16 
Alan Cohn Climate 
Program 
Director – 
Integrated 
Water 
Management 
Group 
Bureau of Environmental 
Planning and Analysis 
(BEPA) within the NYC 
Department of Environmental 
Protection (DEP) – NYC  
10/12/16 
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Appendix 2: Sample Interview Questions 
SECTION 1: WARMUP 
• What is your position and department?  
• How does that relate to other departments within your city? 
• When was your department established?  
• When did you come onto the department?  
• What was the driving force behind creating your department? For instance, was it 
a mayor’s initiative, public action, a city council decision, or something else?  
SECTION 2: POLICY ACTIONS 
• Are the main policy goals of your department more about adaptation or 
mitigation? 
• Do you see your department more designing policy or implementing it? 
• How does the policy process work? How does a particular idea become a 
program? For example, do you take follow on initiatives from the mayor/city 
council, or do you generate your own policy?  
§ Following the decision to make policy, how much independence 
do you have from other sectors of government? For instance, do 
you have to have your policies approved by city councils/other 
departments? 
o For a particular program, about how many people will be involved in the 
design and implementation of a policy?  
o Within your department, does the implementation of a policy occur 
primarily by the people who make it or is it frequently delegated to other 
departments or employees?  
• What has been your most successful policy thus far? 
• Is participation particularly important for the success of your programs? If so, 
what do you use to incentivize participation in your programs? Are people 
motivated by a concern of climate change, economic incentives or something 
else? 
• What are the biggest barriers to creating effective climate policy in your 
department? 
SECTION 3: INTERACTION WITH OTHER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 
• Overall, do you think your department has taken a more local or international 
approach to climate policy mitigation? 
• To what extent has your department been pursuing climate policy due to initiative 
taken at the local/city, state and national level? How do local, state and national 
initiatives interact or intersect? 
SECTION 4: PARTNERSHIPS 
• What regional, national or international networks are you a part of, and what 
benefits or problems have they caused for climate action in your city? 
o What is the importance of having these networks? 
• What differences do you see in how your department engages in partnerships and 
negotiations and how these same processes occur between countries? 
SECTION 5: COMPARISON 
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• Are there initiatives you think your department can do that the state cannot, and 
similarly, are there initiatives that you think the state can do that you cannot?  
• Has your department ever come up with innovative policy designs in order to 
address issues that are not normally under city jurisdiction?  
• Do you think that your department faces advantages or limitations that the state or 
national governments do not in climate action?  
• Are there any other differences that you’ve noticed between your policies and 
state or national climate action? 
SECTION 6: OVERVIEW 
• What do you think is the role of city policies in the face of climate change? 
o Do you think your policies are effectively addressing climate change, or is 
there much more to be done? 
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